A separated spouse remains a spouse for survivor-annuity or spouse’s-consent purposes.
No matter how long a separation continues, a marriage does not end until a court orders the divorce (or a spouse dies). For example, Davis v. College Suppliers Co., 813 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D. Miss. 1993); see also Board of Trustees of the Equity-League Pension Tr. Fund v. Royce, 238 F.3d 177, 25 Empl. Benefits Cas. (BL) 2394 (2d Cir. 2001) (although a husband and wife were separated for at least the last 15 years of their 19 years of marriage, they remained spouses until the participant’s death; and a written separation agreement had no effect concerning the plan’s or ERISA’s survivor-annuity provisions).
Likewise, a division of spouses’ marital property does not end their marriage. For example, Callegari v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 16-1750, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105468 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2016) (court-approved consent judgment to separate community property did not end the marriage); Gallagher v. Gallagher, No. 12-40027-TSH, 57 Empl. Benefits Cas. (BL) 2648, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26061 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2013).
But as with any continuing marriage, a spouse might consent to waive a survivor annuity, and might do so in a way that meets ERISA § 205’s and the plan’s conditions.
Although it’s infrequent, I’ve seen separation agreements that include a qualified election and spouse’s consent even a cautious fiduciary would accept. (It can work if at least one of the separating spouses gets really good lawyering.)
If the participant says a separation agreement includes the spouse’s consent, the plan’s administrator might consider that claim when the participant submits her counterpart of the separation agreement, showing the notary’s certificate and seal or stamp. The plan’s administrator would read at least the part of the agreement that might state the spouse’s consent and decide whether it is sufficient under ERISA § 205’s and the plan’s conditions.
Or, a plan might (but need not) excuse a spouse’s consent “if the participant is legally separated . . . (within the meaning of local law) and the participant has a court order [not a mere separation agreement] to such effect[.]” But, a plan must not excuse a spouse’s consent if a qualified domestic relations order “provides otherwise[.]” 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-20, A-27.