Jump to content

Peter Gulia

Senior Contributor
  • Posts

    5,696
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    239

Everything posted by Peter Gulia

  1. Some facts you describe, and some one might guess, suggest a possibility that parent company and subsidiary company together are one employer under Internal Revenue Code § 414(b)-(c)-(m)-(n)-(o). Whether some participation agreement is or is not called for to make the subsidiary company a participating employer turns on what the plan’s governing documents provide. This is not advice to anyone.
  2. From the rule published in today’s Federal Register: The automatic-contribution-arrangement condition “does not apply to—(i) Any plan that includes a qualified cash or deferred arrangement if the plan terms providing for the qualified cash or deferred arrangement were adopted initially before December 29, 2022 (the date of the enactment of section 414A), even if the plan terms providing for the cash or deferred arrangement are effective after that date[.]” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-11-18/pdf/2026-23530.pdf
  3. Numbers789, I read one of your questions, and some replies, as focusing on whether the borrower’s use of a participant loan’s proceeds to clear a debt and unburden a property might be a “purchase” to the extent of the debt cleared. Might one consider that the decedent’s heir or beneficiary owns only some (but not the whole) of the property? Might a purchase to clear the mortgaged property interests be a purchase to that extent? If the written plan grants the administrator discretion to interpret the plan and the loan procedure, the administrator uses the discretion with fiduciary duties of obedience, loyalty, prudence, impartiality, and communication.
  4. Without answering your question: Consider whether the plan’s loans procedure and claims procedure permit the plan’s administrator to rely on a claimant’s statement of facts, made under penalties of perjury, unless the administrator has knowledge that a statement is false. If the plan’s administrator wants to read source documents to evaluate the claimant’s facts and circumstances, consider whether the claimant might produce the decedent’s reverse-mortgage agreement. That agreement might show what a person must pay and do to buy out the lender’s rights. (If the might-be inheritor does not find the reverse-mortgage agreement among the decedent’s papers, consider that the lender might have recorded the mortgage.) Or, the lender might have a form that would show what the lender would accept to satisfy the lender’s rights. This is not advice to anyone.
  5. About a schedule of assets held for investment, see the Form 5500 Instructions at pages 51-52. https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/plan-administration-and-compliance/reporting-and-filing/form-5500/2025-instructions.pdf The rule is 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-11 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-29/section-2520.103-11. Include an asset purchased during the plan year and sold before the plan year’s end unless an exception applies. Among seven exceptions, ÿ shares in a registered investment company, ÿ participations in a bank’s or trust company’s collective trust, and ÿ participations in an insurance company pooled separate account need not be in the schedule if no longer held by the end of the reported-on year. Yet, consider reporting about nonexempt or corrected prohibition transactions, and about other aspects of reporting. This is not advice to anyone.
  6. Also, does it matter whether the plan's financial statements--whether included in a distinct CPA's audit, review, or compilation report, or only in the Form 5500 with no attachment--are on accrual accounting or on the cash-receipts-and-disbursements method of accounting?
  7. Following EBP’s reasoning, the decedent’s estate’s personal representative might amend the plan to confirm the plan’s discontinuance and that a plan termination results from the last beneficiary’s distribution. Also, to amend for each needed provision not already adopted in the IRS-preapproved documents and interim amendments. Unless the plan’s recordkeeper offers a plan-termination amendment, an expense might not be negligible. And if the plan’s recordkeeper offers a plan-termination amendment, it likely comes with no assurance. Because such a document is outside the IRS’s preapproved document, it gets no IRS assurance. And the recordkeeper warns that it provides no tax or other legal advice. I suspect the decedent’s estate’s personal representative will laugh at the formalism of adopting a plan amendment that never will apply to anyone. (The State law that governs the plan does not recognize a purported retroactive change to have such an effect.)
  8. Considering the documents governing the plan and the plan sponsor’s acts, was a matching contribution owed? When you say “no money”, how confident are you that neither the business organization nor any owner has money or other assets? (An owner might not lack assets unless both shoe stores are worthless.) Has the business failed to pay other creditors? Or worse, has the business paid other creditors to the disadvantage of one or more employee-benefit plans? Should the retirement plan’s fiduciary correct the 2021 and later years’ Form 5500 reports to disclose prohibited transactions? Should the retirement plan’s fiduciary evaluate whether to submit a claim to the plan’s fidelity-bond insurer? If the business is unable to pay its debts as they come due, should the business file a voluntary bankruptcy petition? Should the retirement plan’s fiduciary evaluate whether the plan, as a creditor, should file a petition for the business’s involuntary bankruptcy? If a plan’s administrator (often, the plan sponsor business organization) becomes a debtor in a liquidation bankruptcy, the bankruptcy “trustee shall . . . continue to perform the obligations required of the administrator.” 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(11). No matter how thoroughly competent an adviser is about the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code, an adviser might lack knowledge about how a business organization or a human should deal with creditors in ways that do not improperly favor some other others, or improperly fail to give an employee-benefit plan the preference due to it. Although many TPAs and other nonlawyer service providers often provide some ERISA and tax advice incident to one’s services, advice about an employer’s insolvency might be beyond a service provider’s contracted or customary scope. Courts impose liability on a nonlawyer for giving incorrect, or even incomplete, advice. Moreover, a nonlawyer who provides legal advice is held to at least the same standard of care and expertise as a competent lawyer. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 48 (Professional Negligence—Elements and Defenses Generally) reporter’s note on cmt. e (A.L.I. 2000); see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 14 (Statutory Violations as Negligence Per se) (A.L.I. 2010 & Supp. 2026). This is not advice to anyone.
  9. Consider whether the opportunity to buy life insurance is a “right to a particular form of investment”, and so an “other right or feature”. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-4(e)(3)(iii)(C) https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/part-1/section-1.401(a)(4)-4#p-1.401(a)(4)-4(e)(3)(iii)(C). Consider whether a life insurance death benefit is an “ancillary benefit”. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-4(e)(2) https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/part-1/section-1.401(a)(4)-4#p-1.401(a)(4)-4(e)(2). One might be reluctant to preserve the opportunity to pay life insurance premiums only for participants who began the contract before the plan-amendment date if the only participant who fits that description is a highly-compensated participant. Isn’t it simpler to continue the life insurance opportunity for all participants, or all non-severed participants? This is not advice to anyone.
  10. Revenue Procedure 2016-37 includes this: “Section 7. Terminating plans. Notwithstanding sections 5 and 6 of this revenue procedure, the termination of a plan ends the plan’s remedial amendment period and, thus, generally will shorten the remedial amendment period for the plan. Accordingly, any retroactive remedial plan amendments or other required plan amendments for a terminating plan (that is, plan amendments required to be adopted to reflect qualification requirements that apply as of the date of termination) must be adopted in connection with the plan termination regardless of whether such requirements are included on a Required Amendments List.” But the Revenue Procedure does not define what “the termination of a plan” means. If the plan sponsor did no act and made no decision to end the plan, is the happenstance of the last beneficiary claiming his distribution a plan termination that invokes a need to amend the written plan? This is not an academic question. The decedent’s estate’s personal representative, acting as the retirement plan’s administrator, must evaluate whether a plan amendment is necessary so that it’s proper and prudent to charge the expense for it against the plan’s assets and allocate that charge to the segregated account of the remaining beneficiary.
  11. Here are my guesses: (Assume all relevant years are the calendar year.) If a plan does not accept the Treasury’s saver’s-match contribution, there might be no need for a plan amendment. If a plan accepts the Treasury’s saver’s-match contribution, adopt the written-plan amendment by the end of the first year in which the plan accepted a saver’s-match contribution. For example, if the plan accepted a saver’s-match contribution in 2028, amend the written plan by December 31, 2028. Beyond what’s needed for a plan to maintain in form a tax-qualified treatment, some service providers might prefer that a service recipient express whether the plan accepts or refuses a saver’s-match contribution. Or, absent the service recipient’s affirmative instruction, be treated as having instructed the service provider to provide its services presuming the default provision the service provider communicated to its service recipient. Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code, a Treasury rule, or Internal Revenue Service guidance relieves how ERISA §§ 401-405 apply regarding a plan so governed. This is not advice to anyone.
  12. Is this a life insurance contract? Or an annuity contract? Or something else? Does the contract require continuing premiums? Does the contract permit further premiums? If there is a choice, does the participant want to pay further premiums?
  13. Many BenefitsLink discussions remark on a need for a plan-termination amendment to make a plan that has been relying on a remedial-amendment period and interim amendments “up to Code” as of the moment the plan is terminated. Imagine this situation: A one-participant plan was established and is maintained, with the plan sponsor having adopted all interim amendments the recordkeeper presented. The participant died. Of two designated beneficiaries, one claimed her death benefit and was paid. Now, the other beneficiary is getting ready to claim his death benefit. What if the plan pays that last beneficiary not because the plan sponsor decided the plan’s termination but because the plan’s administrator finds that the beneficiary is entitled to his death benefit? If the plan sponsor does not amend the plan, would the plan’s distribution to the last remaining beneficiary be a distribution from a tax-qualified plan?
  14. If the plan has only one participant who would have a before-amendment accrued benefit, how much does it matter that the plan sponsor might prefer to disable that participant from getting a hardship distribution or other in-service distribution from the before-amendment accrual? Is it about a protection from the participant’s potential creditors? Is it about efficiency in a service provider’s work?
  15. ERISA Outline Book 2025 § 6.III.D.2.b [page 6.123] (Am. Ret. Ass’n © 2025) states: “A profit sharing plan or stock bonus plan, including a section 401(k) arrangement under such [a] plan, may be amended to eliminate a hardship distribution option . . . , without having to protect the pre-amendment option with respect to accrued benefits.” The authority the EOB cites for that statement is the text I quoted above. I’ll leave it to others to discern whether the Treasury’s rule supports the EOB’s conclusion. The Treasury’s explanation of the rulemaking is: Limitations on Availability of Benefits [final rule], 53 Federal Register 26050 (July 11, 1988), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1988-07-11/pdf/FR-1988-07-11.pdf. This is not advice to anyone.
  16. A Treasury rule includes this: Amendment of hardship distribution standards. A qualified cash or deferred arrangement that permits hardship distributions under § 1.401(k)-1(d)(3) may be amended to specify or modify nondiscriminatory and objective standards for determining the existence of an immediate and heavy financial need, the amount necessary to meet the need, or other conditions relating to eligibility to receive a hardship distribution. For example, a plan will not be treated as violating section 411(d)(6) merely because it is amended to specify or modify the resources an employee must exhaust to qualify for a hardship distribution or to require employees to provide additional statements or representations to establish the existence of a hardship. A qualified cash or deferred arrangement may also be amended to eliminate hardship distributions. The provisions of this paragraph also apply to profit-sharing or stock bonus plans that permit hardship distributions, whether or not the hardship distributions are limited to those described in § 1.401(k)-1(d)(3). 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-4 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/section-1.411(d)-4. BenefitsLink mavens, does this suggest a plan amendment must not wholly remove a right to a hardship distribution for an amount accrued before the amendment?
  17. Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.) § 401(a)(14): A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that, unless the participant otherwise elects, the payment of benefits under the plan to the participant will begin not later than the 60th day after the latest of the close of the plan year in which— (A) the date on which the participant attains the earlier of age 65 or the normal retirement age specified under the plan, (B) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which the participant commenced participation in the plan, or (C) the participant terminates his service with the employer. ERISA’s title I has somewhat different, but related, provisions.
  18. Before considering potential corrections or even a communication to the plan sponsor or the participant, consider thinking about these points. TPA Has the plan sponsor engaged the third-party administrator to provide tax law advice? Does the TPA firm employ a worker who is an attorney-at-law, certified public accountant, enrolled agent, enrolled actuary, or enrolled retirement plan agent? These are the kinds of individuals who might have some right to practice before the Internal Revenue Service [31 C.F.R. § 10.3 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/section-10.3], and so might receive or make a communication that might get a limited evidence-law privilege under Internal Revenue Code § 7525 (see below). Could an unprivileged or under-privileged communication make an advisee’s situation worse by turning a failure the advisee might have defended as unknowing into a knowing failure? Or by creating discoverable evidence that otherwise might not exist? Would the TPA’s insurance defend and indemnify the TPA against a claim that the TPA provided inaccurate or incomplete advice? Actuary Does an awareness that a pension plan might have been or might be tax-disqualified affect an actuarial valuation? Has the plan sponsor engaged the actuary to provide tax law advice beyond an actuarial valuation? Could an unprivileged or under-privileged communication make an advisee’s situation worse by turning a failure the advisee might have defended as unknowing into a knowing failure? Or by creating discoverable evidence that otherwise might not exist? Would the actuary’s insurance defend and indemnify the actuary against a claim that the actuary provided inaccurate or incomplete advice? Which communications are unprotected? Unlike the evidence-law privilege for confidential communications made to get an attorney-at-law’s legal advice, the privilege for confidential communications to get a Federally-authorized tax practitioner’s tax law advice is much more limited. I.R.C. (26 U.S.C.) § 7525 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title26/html/USCODE-2024-title26-subtitleF-chap77-sec7525.htm. The § 7525 privilege can apply only to the extent of communications made for the taxpayer to get the practitioner’s tax advice that is within the practitioner’s rights of practice. For an enrolled actuary or an enrolled retirement plan agent, this is not the whole Internal Revenue Code. For example, an enrolled actuary’s practice before the Internal Revenue Service is limited to issues involving specified Internal Revenue Code sections, and the range of them is not intuitive. While an actuary’s practice may include § 401, § 404, § 412, § 413, and § 414, it excludes § 402 and § 415. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(d)(2). An enrolled retirement plan agent’s IRS practice rights include issues involving the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System. The § 7525 privilege can apply only to a proceeding before the Internal Revenue Service or a Federal court about a tax matter, not anything else. The § 7525 privilege never applies to a State proceeding, even if the proceeding involves a tax. If a participant’s spouse or former spouse asserts—whether in a State’s court, or even in a Federal court—a contract claim that the plan’s administrator did not apply the plan’s qualified-election provision when the participant took a distribution, communications with a Federally-authorized tax practitioner other than an attorney-at-law get no privilege. The Treasury department lacks power to regulate a tax preparer who does not otherwise act as a representative before the Internal Revenue Service. So, a communication with someone is only a preparer is not protected. This is not advice to anyone. My explanation above does not reflect my view about what the law ought to be.
  19. About your questions relating to the plan’s definition of compensation and how it might affect coverage and nondiscrimination, and other plan provisions, consider this: The company you describe might have resources to support finding, evaluating, and defending interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code beyond those expressed in the Treasury’s rules, some of which are not legislative rules. Also, some parts or elements in the § 414(s) regulations might be ambiguous and so open to interpretation. Further, the company might consider how the retirement plan’s provisions relate to securities laws.
  20. Here is the statute (as published for the Public Law and the Statutes at Large): Retire through Ownership Act, Pub. L. No. 119-124 § 2(a)(4) (Oct. 15, 2026), 140 Stat. 1074 (2026). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ124/pdf/PLAW-119publ124.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ124/html/PLAW-119publ124.htm https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ124/uslm/PLAW-119publ124.xml https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-119publ124
  21. That an investment-adviser firm’s representative gets no direct or indirect compensation might not be good enough if the representative is an owner of the firm, or otherwise has some interest regarding the firm’s compensation. This is not advice to anyone.
  22. ERISA § 3 [29 U.S.C. § 1002] Definitions (14) The term “party in interest” means, as to an employee-benefit plan— (A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator, officer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee-benefit plan; (B) a person providing services to such plan; (C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan; (D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by such plan; (E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of— (i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation{,} (ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or (iii) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is an employer or an employee organization described in subparagraph (C) or (D); (F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15)) of any individual described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E); (G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in which) 50 percent or more of— (i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corporation, (ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or (iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate, is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E); (H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 percent or more shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the employee-benefit plan; or (I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in capital or profits) partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G). . . . . (15) The term “relative” means a spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, or spouse of a lineal descendant. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2024-title29/html/USCODE-2024-title29-chap18-subchapI-subtitleA-sec1002.htm
  23. Even if you never work with health plans, a case involving a “No Suprises Act” rule raises a question that matters for all situations in which Congress delegates to an executive agency a power to make a legislative rule. An appeals court decided that some parts of a rule to implement Congress’s “No Suprises Act” are contrary to law, and vacated those parts. Beyond not applying those parts in deciding the litigants’ dispute, the court might have nullified those parts of the rule from applying to anyone, anywhere in the United States. The Solicitor General argues that the Administrative Procedure Act’s scope-of-review provision [5 U.S.C. § 706] for a court “[t]o the extent necessary to decision” to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law” does not empower a court to vacate an agency rule as to everyone. Rather, a court’s relief properly applies only to the litigants in the particular dispute the court has power to decide. Further, the Solicitor General argues: “[E]ven if the Court were to hold that vacatur is a permissible remedy under the APA, [the Court] should treat vacatur as an equitable remedy subject to ordinary equitable principles.” Among those principles, “remedies ‘ordinarily operate with respect to specific parties,’ rather than ‘on legal rules in the abstract[.]’” United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Texas Medical Ass’n, No. 26-491 (U.S., cert. petition filed Oct. 14, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/26/26-491/429429/20261014091943719_TMA%20v.%20HHS%20Petition.pdf. If the Supreme Court grants review and decides what the Solicitor General asks for, a Federal district court’s decision—even one declaring an agency rule contrary to law—would have no effect beyond the particular case’s litigants. An appeals court’s nonprecedential decision would have no effect beyond the particular case’s litigants. An appeals court’s precedent would affect only cases litigated in a district in that circuit’s geographic range. (For example, an Eleventh Circuit precedent affects only districts in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.) Others arguing that an agency’s rule is contrary to law would need to litigate those issues case-by-case. What’s meant as national law might not become uniform until an appropriate case is litigated in the Supreme Court and is decided by that Court’s reasoned opinion. Some people might find that unsettling. But it’s not much different than what can happen with courts interpreting a statute that lacks a call for an executive agency to make a legislative rule. While I describe some of the Solicitor General’s arguments, I don’t express any view.
  24. The Treasury’s rule to interpret and implement Internal Revenue Code § 401(a)(9) includes this: (b) Determination of account balance — (1) General rule. In the case of an individual account under a defined contribution plan, the benefit used in determining the required minimum distribution for a distribution calendar year is the account balance as of the last valuation date in the calendar year preceding that distribution calendar year (valuation calendar year) adjusted in accordance with this paragraph (b). For this purpose, all of [a participant’s] accounts under the plan are aggregated. Thus, all separate accounts, including a separate account for employee contributions under section 72(d)(2), [but not a designated Roth account, and not the value of a qualifying longevity annuity contract] are aggregated for purposes of this section [26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-5]. (2) Adjustment for subsequent allocations and distributions — (i) Subsequent allocations. The account balance is increased by the amount of any contributions or forfeitures allocated to the account balance as of dates in the valuation calendar year after the valuation date. For this purpose, contributions that are allocated to the account balance as of dates in the valuation calendar year after the valuation date, but that are not actually made during the valuation calendar year, may be excluded. (ii) Subsequent distributions. The account balance is decreased by distributions made in the valuation calendar year after the valuation date. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(9)-5(b) https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/part-1/section-1.401(a)(9)-5#p-1.401(a)(9)-5(b). If a plan’s administrator follows that rule: If the plan has only one valuation date in each year, that date is each March 31, and 2026 is the distribution calendar year for which one calculates a minimum distribution: March 31, 2025 balance plus contributions and forfeitures allocated (or allocated and made) April 1 through December 31, 2025 minus distributions made April 1 through December 31, 2025 equals account balance to determine the 2026 minimum distribution. This is not advice to anyone.
  25. Thank you for sharing a further reasoning. Among other issues, whether a complaint plausibly asserts a claim on which relief could be granted might turn on whether the complaint alleges facts from which a judge could find that the valuation expert was not independent regarding the person who might have engaged in a prohibited transaction. It might be disloyal or imprudent for a valuation-reviewing fiduciary if that fiduciary knows or, in the exercise of prudent diligence, would know that the valuation expert is not independent.
×
×
  • Create New...