This situation suggests two key law issues, first under State law and then under Federal law:
(1) If yesterday a court had ended Pat’s marriage to Sam, can a court tomorrow order that Pat and Sam were married yesterday?
(2) If a State court’s order says Pat and Sam were married yesterday (and the order is a domestic-relations order within the meaning of ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii)), would following that order “require [the] plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided under the plan [or] require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of actuarial value)[.]” ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D).
It’s hard to do much about question 1. But employee-benefits practitioners might help some judges learn the legal, economic, and practical effects of question 2.
A related point: The situation the originating post describes illustrates some usefulness of venue provisions in an employee-benefit plan’s governing document. If the plan’s administrator decides the revised order is not a QDRO and the would-be surviving spouse challenges that decision, would the plan’s employer/sponsor/administrator prefer that the challenger be compelled to proceed in Federal (rather than State) court and in the district the plan’s sponsor chose?
Newbie’s committee has a lawyer and we don’t presume to advise either of them. As we use this thread for academic interest or professional development, among many court decisions about the issues raised one might read these:
(1) Padgett v. Little, 172 Cal. App. 4th 830, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475, 47 Empl. Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1050, 1061 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (A trial court exceeded its authority by using the ruse of a nunc pro tunc [now for then] order in its attempt to create an interest.).
(2) Garcia-Tatupu v. Bert Bell/Peter Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, 249 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Mass. 2017) (whether a nunc pro tunc order entitled a participant’s former spouse to a benefit turned on whether the former spouse’s interest had been established before the participant’s death so that the order did not create a new benefit not otherwise payable).