Do IRS examiners know who supervises them?

The Internal Revenue Service has had six people lead the agency this year.

Now, Billy Long is out as IRS commissioner, with the Secretary of the Treasury serving as acting commissioner.

The deputy commissioner position is vacant.

The chief of staff role is vacant.

More than half the officer positions are vacant or “(acting)”.

What do we imagine about the pace of new examinations in 2025?

From a recent (Aug. 8, 2025, 5:38 PM EDT) Bloomberg Tax article: “Bessent will step in as House Republicans look to cut the [Internal Revenue Service’s] funding by more than 20% to $9.5 billion, an even bigger cut than the White House proposal.”

Peter, who the heck knows? So many clichés about chaos and ineptitude come to mind I'm just paralyzed by the choices to comment. Maybe things will be different come 2029 if there is still an IRS by then, but thankfully won't be my concern any more. 

Some clients make sincere efforts to administer a retirement plan correctly. Some do right things the right way for no more reason than they feel good about doing so.

But some clients ask intelligent questions about how much enforcement an executive agency does. Some intuit that an agency lacks resources even to spot a potential failure.

While many lawyers and other advisers don’t volunteer information about nondetection and nonenforcement, when a client asks one must give an honest answer. Even declining to describe how much effort an agency puts on an issue practically reveals the answer—not much, often none.

If the tides at EBSA and IRS don’t change soon, the next generation of retirement-plans practitioners will miss experiences that could have been learning opportunities.

Speculating about the possibility of an agency being unable to detect or enforce an issue can be seen as a violation of a practitioner's professional ethical standards (and possibly of Circular 230 (10.37(a)(2)(vi)).)

The current assault on the ability of agencies capabilities to detect or enforce regulations has an element of intentionally disabling enforcement.  There exists a relatively small but significant number of individuals who will ignore regulations simply because they do not expect to be held accountable.  If their noncompliance is discovered, they often will be more than willing to challenge at least the initial efforts to hold them accountable, knowing that agencies will lack resources on a vigorous pursuit of enforcement.

May all generations of retirement plan practitioners embrace honesty and integrity, and not be tempted to counsel clients on the risk of being caught for noncompliance.

Paul I, you’re right to mention that Circular 230 rule. Here’s another outlook.

Even when 31 C.F.R. § 10.37 applies or someone volunteers to follow it, the rule refers only to written advice. Further, even if a practitioner applies the rule to oral communications, one might distinguish between advice and information.

Here’s § 10.37(a)(2)(vi): “The practitioner must—Not, in evaluating a Federal tax matter, take into account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit.”

Some advisers think it’s possible to provide advice or an evaluation about how law applies if all issues and facts are detected and fully pursued AND provide information, especially if one’s client asks, about whether an issue or failure might not be detected, or about whether an executive agency might compromise, or not pursue, enforcement.

There is a difference between advising a client to do something, and informing a client about what seems likely or unlikely to happen if one’s client does a thing it describes.

Many of us might prefer that persons obey law, even civil tax law. But I don’t always presume that it’s my right as an adviser to cause my advisee to obey law if that’s not the choice the principal would make for itself. I work to enhance my client’s autonomy by adding to its information and decision-making capabilities. (My clients welcome my judgment, but many don’t want to wholly abdicate the principal’s decision-making.)

While I might not volunteer information about nondetection and nonenforcement, if a client asks I won’t give a dishonest answer. I might decline to answer. Or if I answer, I might not say any more than I know as fact. Yet, there also can be situations in which providing candid information about nondetection or nonenforcement might help a decision-maker think through legitimate choices with competing values.

I’m mindful that some consider that providing information about nondetection or nonenforcement might in context be tantamount to telling one’s client to disobey law. About that, I show my summertime professional-conduct students the exchange of Yale Law Journal articles arguing different outlooks about that point. And other professional-conduct literature about whether an adviser has a “duty to the system.”

I don’t see it as my personal responsibility in my work as an adviser to save the government from the government’s choices about law enforcement. (I might have some responsibilities as a citizen; but that’s distinct from my special-purpose role as an adviser.)

If an advisee’s behavior is dispiriting, an adviser might consider one’s professional prerogative to withdraw one’s availability.

“Robert Choi, the leader of tax-exempt and government entities division, . . . , also [was] put on [administrative] leave.”

Erin Slowey, Three Top IRS Leaders Put on Leave in Second Wave of Removals, Bloomberg Daily Tax Report (Aug. 16, 2025, 12:42 PM EDT).