"[W]hile the Supreme Court's decision prevents us from presuming that 'absent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits themselves, a general durational clause says nothing about the vesting of retiree benefits,' we also cannot presume that the absence of such specific language, by itself, evidences an intent not to vest benefits or that a general durational clause says everything about the intent to vest ... [We] remand so the district court can decide, among other things, outside the 'shadow of Yard-Man,' [1] what documents make up the parties' Agreements; [2] whether reference to extrinsic evidence is appropriate; and [3] whether the Agreements, and any extrinsic evidence that may be considered, vests with Retirees lifetime contribution-free health care benefits. The district court should use ordinary principles of contract law to answer these questions, without a 'thumb on the scale' in favor of either party." [Tackett v. M&G Polymers, No. 12-3329 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 2016)]

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