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Person B's input isn't required, in fact some divorce agreements will specifically make drafting and filing a DRO the responsibility of a particular party so that the other party doesn't have to deal with it. The plan literally CANNOT make a DRO qualified until AFTER its been filed with the court. So either these are wrong, or out of order. Person B's signature is not required keep track in writing or every written request and response for the information. This is something to hope EBSA can help with. I don't know what this means. Are they asking Person B to sign something? asking them to take money out of the plan? There isn't anything for an alternate payee to accept or reject. If they think the DRO was written wrong that is typically something for them and their lawyer to work out with the other person's lawyer. Not the plan. I don't think this means what you think it means. for a DRO to be qualified - it literally just means that it has the appropriate information mandated by federal law, such as being able to identify the people involved, the plan involved, that the award isn't in a form that the plan doesn't allow etc. Qualified doesn't mean the order has a money split that is the same as what the parties agreed upon.

I think you might be conflating "legally qualified" and "aligns with an equitable agreed upon division of marital property" . they are Not the same. Legally qualified for a DRO - is just a checklist based on the rules in Federal Law. Has almost nothing to do with the amount, value, formula of the benefit awarded written into a DRO for the alternate payee. Q: Does person B have a copy of the DRO? It not, perhaps they can get one from the court records. If yes - Q: is the Plan Administrator saying the DRO is Qualified? Was that communicated in writing from the Plan Administrator to person B? The DRO is not a QDRO until the plan says it is. And then the plan is required to provide person B with all the things - the QDRO procedures, the acceptance of the plan that it is qualified, information about segregation of the money into a separate account, or distribution options, etc. If the plan administrator is not providing those things, then person B can ask EBSA to help. If the plan administrator is refusing the say if the DRO is qualified or not - and person B wants it to be qualified - then person B needs to submit the DRO to the plan and ask them to deny it or qualify it. In writing. Q: Does Person B believe the benefit awarded in the DRO is NOT what was agreed to in the property settlement agreement? If they think the DRO is drafted wrong, and doesn't align with the agreed upon split of marital assets - then it is something for a family law attorney to work on. The Plan Administrator has no say in the formula or benefit award in a DRO, qualified or not. Person B should take a copy of the DRO and a copy of their marital property agreement to a family law attorney and ask them to see if the two align. If the issue is the Marital Property agreement should be amended - then that has nothing to do with the plan either.

Congrats on retirement. I would assume most people on a forum like this know about this IRS table with all the limits going back 1989. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/cola-table.pdf

If you updated the source to be included in the 2026 year, Relius does not go back and mark the source to be included in the 2025 year. Make sure that you have both years marked to include the source in the testing.

I wasn't aware 1 was an option but sounds OK and yes, 2 is definitely OK. Correct, you need not use the same methodology for 410b, 401a4 and 401a26.

Apologies for the delay and thank you to those that responded since my last reply. These two questions posed is the issue Person B has. Person A: Drafted the DRO without any input from Person B Qualified the DRO as they are the plan administrator Sent to the judge with their signature and their representation's signature Person B has never signed the DRO or the QDRO Has not given Person B the plan's QDRO policy despite being asked dozens of times over the course of months Person A is trying to strong arm Person B in accepting the QDRO despite lying about everything related to money for the last 5 years and also not providing the plan documentation Person B is legally required to have as a plan participant. It boils down to this: How can anyone outside of Person A know the DRO is legally qualified, if they handled every single step of procedure and also refuse to show their work as to how they deemed it qualified? Person B has reached out to EBSA in the last week but I don't know anything more about it at this point. Thanks!

Did you pair the proper Relius account number to that source? Like, maybe your account 201 is accidentally the match source.

for Vestwell (New York NY / AZ / PA / TX)View the full text of this job opportunity

So, the recordkeepers that do this can limit the percentage of each deferral or other contribution directed to a to-be-limited designated investment alternative, but don’t limit an account balance? That’s helpful information, thank you.

I rarely use Relius Administration, but I have to for a particular project, and it is just NOT intuitive. I set up my plan specs and I am trying to run ADP testing. I get a pop-up that says: "In Plan Specifications at least one Plan Source must be coded to be included in he ADP/ACP test." But it is! It is! I've looked through other screens to see if I am missing something, but it just isn't staring at me. Any ideas?

@Peter Gulia, having a cap on the percentage of a contribution that can be invested in a specific investment is used by some plans to limit investments in: publicly traded stock of the employer, self-directed brokerage accounts (particularly when there are few restrictions on permissible investments within the SDBA), investments in that are not easily tradable like gold bullion or real estate, and investments where the plan fiduciaries are concerned about the volatility of the investment. Most recordkeepers can support this type of limit. Note, though, that recordkeepers may not support automatic re-balancing when the value of these investments exceed a specified percentage of the value of a participant's overall plan account.

for SetAway LLC (Remote / Chester NH / CT / MA / ME / RI / VT / Hybrid)View the full text of this job opportunity

Carol, thanks for all your contributions, on your webpage and on these Message Boards, as well as your standards of excellence. You will enjoy retirement!

for SetAway, LLC (Remote / Bedford NH / CT / MA / ME / RI / VT / Hybrid)View the full text of this job opportunity

If an employer doesn’t volunteer to pay plan-administration expenses, expenses necessarily are borne by participants (and beneficiaries and alternate payees). The question is how to allocate expenses among individual accounts. I can see how someone who keep one’s addresses tidy and up-to-date might feel she should not be charged for expenses made necessary by others who did not maintain one’s addresses.

BTW, my wife just said you becoming a volunteer EMT at retirement age is one of the coolest things she’s ever heard.

Tell him to roll money back in so it can be distributed. If he doesn’t, issue the 1099s showing some of the money can’t be rolled over and cause him some heartache.

Carol, I have made use of your list many a times over the years. Thanks so much. Great that BL will be taking it over. Good luck in your ACTIVE retirement!

As long as the fee is allowed by the plan, is reasonable, and disclosed in the participant fee disclosure notices I don't see a problem with it, though maybe I'm overlooking something. There are things you need to send participants beside payments at retirement or RMD age and if they don't notify you of address changes someone needs to pay to locate them, I don't see where charging the participant is problematic if it is part of the Plan's on going operations and uniformly applied.

Does any recordkeeper offer (assuming the customer plan has enough purchasing power) services to support the professors' "Retirement Guardrails" idea? For example, imagine a plan's sponsor/administrator specifies that a mutual fund investing in securities about gold or precious metals is a designated investment alternative but only for no more than 5% of a participant's account. Has any recordkeeper developed the systems to apply that "guardrail" constraint?

Late Friday, brain freeze time Need to check something with the gurus as I have been researching and failing to find. Testing for 401a26 and annual method fails. Software has couple options: 1. Change to average salary (highest 3) and test against annual accrual 2. Change to average salary and use accrued-to-date method (been doing the plan since day one so have all the data) Any issues with either of the above? Also, I could not find anything that would prohibit me testing 410b and 401a4 using different methods than 401a26. Anything I am not able to find? Thank you

for SetAway, LLC (Remote / CT / MA / ME / NH / VT / Hybrid)View the full text of this job opportunity

for Aon (Remote / Hybrid)View the full text of this job opportunity

WHO CAN SUE UNDER ERISA A plaintiff has standing to bring a claim under ERISA if he/she is a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. Caples v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 444 F. App'x 49, 52 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)); Cobb, 461 F.3d at 634; Coleman v. Champion Int'l Corp., 992 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1993). A "participant" under ERISA is an "employee or former employee" of an employer offering an employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). A "fiduciary" is someone who (1) exercises "discretionary authority . . . respecting management of such plan or . . . disposition of its assets," (2) "renders investment advice for . . . compensation . . . with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan," or (3) "has any discretionary authority or . . . responsibility in the administration of such plan," Id. § 1002(21)(A). A "beneficiary" is defined as "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." Id. § 1002(8). In order to qualify as a beneficiary, an individual must have "a reasonable or colorable claim to benefits." Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Cobb, 461 F.3d at 635-36 (holding that to have standing as a beneficiary under ERISA, a plaintiff must show both that he or she was designated as such by the participant or terms of the plan, and that he or she has a colorable entitlement to benefits under the plan). In Parsons v. Board of Trustees of the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust, Civil Action No. 2:20-cv-00132, USDC (S.D. WV 2020) that you can find at - https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12166270204191846086&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=bY5nDLcAAAAJ:14880692104701005079:AAGBfm2qi1_JaXLJvydb4f3quYTnTlLkbA, the Court set forth a good summary of the rights of potential Alternate Payees to sue a pension plan for benefits claimed to be payable by reason of a QDRO. At issue in this case was whether or not the language of the QDRO was broad enough to include survivor annuity benefits. Said the Court - “ERISA was enacted to protect employees and their beneficiaries by ensuring the proper administration of employee benefit plans. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997). The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) amended ERISA with respect to surviving spouses in two important ways. REA requires pension plans to provide automatic benefits to surviving spouses. Id. at 843; 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a). Additionally, while ERISA generally prohibits assignment or alienation of benefits under a pension plan, REA provides for a Qualified Domestic Relation Order (QDRO) exception wherein a former spouse or children of a previous marriage may be designated as an alternate payee and thereby "receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(l). “A domestic relations order is any judgment, decree, or property settlement that "relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant" and "is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law." Id. at § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). However, in order for a domestic relations order to qualify as a QDRO, it must meet the following requirements: (1) the order must specify the name and mailing address of the alternate payee and the affected plan participant, (2) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid or the means by which that amount will be determined, (3) the number of payments or time period to which the order applies, and (4) each plan to which the order applies. Id. at § 1056(d)(3)(C). Moreover, a QDRO cannot (1) require the plan to provide any type of benefit not otherwise provided, (2) require the plan to provide increased benefits, or (3) require benefits to be paid to an alternate payee which must be paid to another alternate payee under the QDRO. Id. at § 1056(d)(3)(D). “A plan administrator generally has discretion to determine whether a domestic relations order constitutes a QDRO, but such determinations are reviewable by courts. Dorn v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 211 F.3d 938, 946 (5th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a domestic relations order is a QDRO, courts have required substantial compliance with the drafting requirements. Hamilton v. Washington State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension Plan, 433 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). The "pivotal question is whether the dissolution order `clearly contains the information specified in the statute that a plan administrator would need to make an informed decision.'" Id. (quoting Stewart v. Thorpe Holding Co. Profit Sharing Plan, 207 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)). “If a domestic relations order qualifies as a QDRO, then "any spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant" that is designated as an alternate payee shall be considered a "beneficiary under the plan." Id. at §§ 1056(d)(3)(J)-(K). Thereby, a former spouse can obtain a secured interest in benefits merely by obtaining a QDRO. Id. at 1056(d)(3)(A); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 164 F.3d 857, 864 (4th Cir. 1998); Hopkins v. AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co., 105 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1997). “As noted above, ERISA requires pension plans to provide automatic survivor benefits to retiring participants. Dorn, 211 F.3d at 943. A Qualified Q Annuity (QJ&SA) is the principal mechanism for providing such survivor benefits. Id. "[A] QJ&SA comprises two separate and distinct benefits: (1) An annuity for the life of the participant, and (2) a succeeding annuity for the life of the surviving spouse (if there is one) of not less than 50% of the participant annuity." Id. Generally, in order for one to qualify as a surviving spouse in the context of a QJ&SA they must be married to the participant "(1) during the applicable election period, (2) on the annuity starting date, or (3) at [the participant's] death." Id. at 947 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Former spouses, however, can also receive surviving spouse benefits under certain circumstances. "To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations order ... the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving spouse of such participant." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(F)(i) (emphasis added). Federal courts have held that, in order for a former spouse to be entitled to surviving spouse rights, "any assignment of surviving spouse rights in a QDRO must be explicit, rather than implicit." Hamilton, 433 F.3d at 1099; Hopkins, 105 F.3d at 155; Dorn, 211 F.3d at 947. Moreover, where a QDRO is silent as to surviving spouse rights, a designation of alternate payee or beneficiary does not elevate one to the status of a surviving spouse entitled to a survivor annuity under a QJ&SA. Dorn, 211 F.3d at 947. “The detailed requirements for drafting a QDRO have been characterized as a "drafting morass for the lawyer." Hamilton, 433 F.3d at 1096. The Court recognizes "the concern expressed by courts and commentators that the failure of domestic relations lawyers to `navigate the treacherous shoals' of ERISA may harm potential beneficiaries." Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Wheaton, 42 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, "Congress required that QDROs be specific and clear because it was concerned with reducing the expense to plan providers and protecting them from suits for making improper payments." Id. at 1096-97 (quoting In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, the Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider the QDRO or the Plan Document, because review of such documents is premature at the motion to dismiss stage and would instead convert this motion into one for summary judgment. This argument is without merit. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, "a court may consider official public records, documents central to the plaintiff's claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity of these documents is not disputed." Witthohn v. Fed. Ins. Co., 164 Fed. Appx. 395, 396 (4th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider pension plan documents for a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff relies on such documents in the complaint. Stewart v. Pension Trust of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Fed. Appx. 174, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). Both the QDRO and the Plan Document fall under this umbrella and may be considered in light of the motion to dismiss.” ERISA § 404(a)(1) sets forth the primary duties of an ERISA fiduciary, providing that a fiduciary must: (1) act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; (2) act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with like aims; (3) diversify the investments of a plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses; and (4) act in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as they are consistent with the provisions of Titles I and IV of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. A fiduciary may be personally liable for, and removed as a fiduciary as a result of, any breaches of the responsibilities, obligations, and duties imposed by the statute while acting as a fiduciary under ERISA. ERISA § 409. 29 U.S.C. § 1109. Generally, to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant was a fiduciary of an ERISA plan who, (2) acting within his capacity as a fiduciary, (3) engaged in conduct constituting a breach of his fiduciary duty. A good case discussing breach of fiduciary duty is Volz v. General Motors, Civil Action No. 22-cv-3471, United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania (October 5, 2023)- https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10217039916663686201&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=bY5nDLcAAAAJ:17102308171145443235:AFWwaea94w7XgMVkZLP-Q4RdIOLK&html=&pos=1&folt=kw See also, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (duty of loyalty) and 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (duty of prudence). See Barker v. Am. Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995) (ERISA's duty to act in the best interests of the plan participants and beneficiaries includes a duty to investigate suspicions that one has concerning the plan); see also Patterson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2013). See cases citing Barker at - https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=20000006&q="Barker+v.+Am.+Mobil+Power+Corp."+"64+F.3d+1397"+"duty"+"investigate"+'"fiduciary"&btnG= AND THREATEN TO SUE AND ASK FOR LEGAL FEES

I should have specified that the distribution was a rollover to an IRA. So the prior distribution won't help.