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Jakyasar: As a Defined Benefit Plan, Fully Insured Plans under Section 412(e)(3) are subject to the same RMD rules with the exception of the RMD is based only on the vested portion of the account balance. These Plans also usually use the annuity mentod and the terms and conditions of the annuity (or annuity and life insurnace) contracts would dictate the payout. Another method I've experienced, which is the norm, is either the contracts are surrender, the first RMD taken, and the remainder transferred to an IRA, or in some cases the annuity contract is "non-transferrable" (or some Carriers have IRA amendments written into their contracts) and removed from the Plan then annuitized.

I can't *imagine* your plan document requires it to be tested for nondiscrimination solely on a benefits basis. Do your rate groups on an allocations basis, and all the rate groups will pass > 70%. And then (except for the random possible exceptions which we as a pension community will remind you of in subsequent comments) you should be good.

If the plan provides participant-directed investment regarding that contribution: Might not following a participant’s investment direction be a breach of the fiduciary’s ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D) duty of obedience to the plan’s governing documents? Might not following a participant’s investment direction be a tax-qualification defect of not administering the plan according to the written plan? If the securities broker-dealer or a custodian associated with it had the money and the instructions and had an obligation to allocate the contribution among participants’ accounts, should it be the broker-dealer that ought to restore participants’ accounts at the broker-dealer’s expense?

If the plan’s administrator considers that any slayer-rule provision or law might apply or that a claimant might argue that a slayer-rule law applies, the administrator might consider also possible interpretations of the plan’s governing-law provision (if any), exclusive-forum provision (if any), and arbitration provision (if any). If the administrator denies any claim, the administrator should follow its claims procedure and ERISA § 503. Even if the administrator later might seek an interpleader, an administrator might first follow its claims procedure and decide a claim (at least for as much as the administrator can decide). An interpleader does not undo a court’s deference to a plan administrator’s discretionary decisions, at least for those decisions made before the interpleader. For example, Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Marks, 465 F.3d 864, 39 Empl. Benefits Cas. (BL) 1428 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell, 697 F. App’x 989 (11th Cir. 2017) (recognizing, even on interpleader, deference to a claims administrator’s discretionary authority); Liss v. Fid. Emp. Servs. Co., 516 F. App’x 468, 56 Empl. Benefits Cas. (BL) 3042 (6th Cir. 2013) (deferring to the administrator’s discretionary finding on whether a participant had made a beneficiary designation). If circumstances surrounding a participant’s death suggest some possibility of a slayer situation, an administrator might balance competing interests. A fiduciary should not deprive a rightful beneficiary of the beneficiary’s right to a distribution. But a fiduciary also must exercise the care, skill, caution, and diligence ERISA § 404(a)(1) requires to protect the plan against paying or delivering a distribution to someone other than the rightful beneficiary. Some courts’ opinions suggest a plan’s administrator might breach a fiduciary duty if it approves a claim without considering whether the claimant is a slayer if: (i) a plan’s provision or applicable law deprives a slayer of the benefit claimed; (ii) the administrator or other decision-making fiduciary knew (or, had it used the care, skill, caution, and diligence required of the fiduciary, ought to have known) that the claimant is suspected of killing the participant or another person regarding whom the claimant would take; and (iii) a prudent fiduciary acting with the required care would delay its evaluation of the claim until it could find whether the claimant is a slayer. See, for example, First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815 (E.D. Ark. 2007); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Estate of Curtis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 839 F. Supp. 491, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1993). None of this is advice to anyone.

Yes, two year cliff vesting is allowed for safe harbor QACA matching and nonelective contributions.

The QACA employer safe harbor contributions have to vest over no more than 2 years, but it can be 2 year cliff if I recall correctly. as Belgarath points out other employer contributions such as a profit sharing contribution could use a different schedule such as 2/20 if provide in the document. God bless the job security of piece meal retirement legislation that brings us multiple different vesting rules for different types of plans and sources or money.

I find that aspect of the COBRA regs to be way more technical than it needs to be because it's so common to have coverage run through the end of the month, with the 18-month maximum coverage period beginning as of the first of the following month. The rules say you can measure from the date of loss of coverage (rather than the date of the triggering event) if the plan states that the 30-day notice period to notify the plan administrator (who then has 14 days to notify the employee) and that the maximum coverage period is measured from that loss of coverage date (instead of the date of termination of employment or other triggering event). I find this somewhat misaligned with the real world because: From my brief experience at the DOL, they enforce this based solely on the date of loss of coverage; They also didn't care about he 30/14 day distinction since it's usually the same entity anyway, they just enforced as a combined 44 day limit from loss of coverage; Most employers are using template documents, and it's unlikely those documents are customized for something as intricate as this; and The rules are clear that it's fine to have a longer maximum coverage period than is required by law. So are they really going to punish an employer for being more generous without perfectly clarifying in the plan terms? Our template doc does try to address this issue with some generic language: "(If coverage is lost at a date later than the date of the qualifying event and the Plan measures the maximum coverage period and notice period from the date of health coverage loss, then the maximum continuation period will be 18 months from the date of health coverage loss.)" Not perfectly customized, but at least it tackles the issue. Here's the regs: Treas. Reg. §54.4980B-7: Q-4. When does the maximum coverage period end? A-4. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Q&A-4, the maximum coverage period ends 36 months after the qualifying event. The maximum coverage period for a qualified beneficiary who is a child born to or placed for adoption with a covered employee during a period of COBRA continuation coverage is the maximum coverage period for the qualifying event giving rise to the period of COBRA continuation coverage during which the child was born or placed for adoption. Paragraph (b) of this Q&A-4 describes the starting point from which the end of the maximum coverage period is measured. The date that the maximum coverage period ends is described in paragraph (c) of this Q&A-4 in a case where the qualifying event is a termination of employment or reduction of hours of employment, in paragraph (d) of this Q&A-4 in a case where a covered employee becomes entitled to Medicare benefits under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395-1395ggg) before experiencing a qualifying event that is a termination of employment or reduction of hours of employment, and in paragraph (e) of this Q&A-4 in the case of a qualifying event that is the bankruptcy of the employer. See Q&A-8 of §54.4980B-2 for limitations that apply to certain health flexible spending arrangements. See also Q&A-6 of this section in the case of multiple qualifying events. Nothing in §§54.4980B-1 through 54.4980B-10 prohibits a group health plan from providing coverage that continues beyond the end of the maximum coverage period. (b)(1) The end of the maximum coverage period is measured from the date of the qualifying event even if the qualifying event does not result in a loss of coverage under the plan until a later date. If, however, coverage under the plan is lost at a later date and the plan provides for the extension of the required periods, then the maximum coverage period is measured from the date when coverage is lost. A plan provides for the extension of the required periods if it provides both— (i) That the 30-day notice period (during which the employer is required to notify the plan administrator of the occurrence of certain qualifying events such as the death of the covered employee or the termination of employment or reduction of hours of employment of the covered employee) begins on the date of the loss of coverage rather than on the date of the qualifying event; and (ii) That the end of the maximum coverage period is measured from the date of the loss of coverage rather than from the date of the qualifying event. (2) In the case of a plan that provides for the extension of the required periods, whenever the rules of §§54.4980B-1 through 54.4980B-10 refer to the measurement of a period from the date of the qualifying event, those rules apply in such a case by measuring the period instead from the date of the loss of coverage.

It includes plans terminated in the last five years, not currently active ones.

This just doesn't seem rational to me. Whatever/whomever precipitated the death, the coroner/medical examiner is going to determine the cause during the autopsy. And no police dept is going to just throw up their hands and say we may never know. Was it natural causes or did she just lose her balance? Or was there foul play? Regardless of that, the ME is going to complete the death certificate with something more than pending. Weird vibes on this.

I don't work on them. But since they are a type of DB Plan I would assume they would have to satisfy the RMD rules just like any other DB plan would. One way, presumably would be to start annuity payments under the normal form or optional form with spousal consent.

If the plan has reached the point of filing a Standard Termination Notice, you must inform the PBGC that the enrolled actuary's certification of sufficiency (Schedule EA-S) is no longer valid. The plan sponsor should then initiate a distress termination by issuing a new Notice of Intent to Terminate to participants and to the PBGC (which is a recipient of NOIT's in distress terminations but not in standard terminations). If the Standard Termination Notice hasn't yet been filed, the PBGC doesn't yet know "officially" about the termination. A distress termination NOIT should be issued. It goes without saying that you should apprise the PBGC personnel with whom you have been communicating about the client's altered circumstances.

Is there anything in this particular plan document that says a loan becomes payable in full immediately upon the employee becoming a union member (or more generally, transferring to an excluded class of employees)? Usually I would only see that kind of provision apply upon termination of employment, but I suppose it could happen. Absent that, I don't think so. The employee continues to repay it through payroll deduction (assuming that's what the loan policy says). Transferring to an excluded class means you are not entitled to future contributions. Loan repayments are not contributions.

I am under the impression that QACAs could have a three year cliff vesting schedule but six year graded is not allowed..