Leaderboard

Correct. Updated info goes in 1 & 2 and old info in 4a and b.

I suggest that before you waste your time responding the Jack Stevenson you take a look at his repetitive posts over the last few months. https://benefitslink.com/boards/profile/103326-jack-stevenson/content/

Not the ones who roll over their balances. But the exception is for termination of employment, not termination of the plan. 72(t)(2)(A): (v) made to an employee after separation from service after attainment of age 55,

A domestic relations order can provide for a single sum payment from a defined contribution plan to an alternate payee. The plan should be indifferent to the underlying reason for the payment unless something impermissible is presented. How the order is worded may pose a problem for the plan. The underlying reason and the wording is a matter for the domestic relations court. If alimony is the underlying basis (or one of the reasons) for awarding an interest to an alternate payee in a defined contribution plan, the order need not use the word “alimony”.

As long as no HCE has a higher rate than any NHCE then the test should pass on a current/contribution/allocation basis.

Yes: IRC section 414(p)(1)(B)(i). The trick is to be able to reconcile your concept of alimony payments with the requirements of IRC section 414(p)(3)(A), among others. You can’t just tell the plan to make alimony payments in the same way a person would pay alimony to a former spouse.

Nothing in the definition(s) of a QDRO requires anyone (other than the court) to sign, but applicable state laws and/or court procedures might do so. It's acceptable to include multiple plans in a DRO, so long as they have the same plan sponsor.

It's very clear that once you are in the PBGC term process you cannot do an auto cash out. Missing and unresponsive under cashout go to PBGC. Missing over cashout go to PBGC. Unresponsive over cashout must have an annuity purchased.

Tom, ignoring it might work, but then again months from now a participant, or all the participants, could make a claim along the lines that Peter Gulia explains above. If liability for the amount is clear and it's not you, risk mitigation might suggest striking while iron is hot.

I can't *imagine* your plan document requires it to be tested for nondiscrimination solely on a benefits basis. Do your rate groups on an allocations basis, and all the rate groups will pass > 70%. And then (except for the random possible exceptions which we as a pension community will remind you of in subsequent comments) you should be good.

If the plan provides participant-directed investment regarding that contribution: Might not following a participant’s investment direction be a breach of the fiduciary’s ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D) duty of obedience to the plan’s governing documents? Might not following a participant’s investment direction be a tax-qualification defect of not administering the plan according to the written plan? If the securities broker-dealer or a custodian associated with it had the money and the instructions and had an obligation to allocate the contribution among participants’ accounts, should it be the broker-dealer that ought to restore participants’ accounts at the broker-dealer’s expense?

SLAYER STATUTES - PREEMPTION? In Maryland, Section 11-112 of the Estates and Trusts Article (the “slayer statute”) provides, inter alia: "(c)(1) The survivorship interest of a disqualified person in property held with the decedent, including a form of co-ownership with incidents of survivorship, is severed at the time of the death of the decedent and the property passes as if the decedent and the disqualified person have no rights by survivorship." In Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Miscevic , 880 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2018) https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17460001952525060856&q=+Laborers%27+Pension+Fund+v.+Miscevic,+880+F.3d+927+(7th+Cir.+2018)&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20003&as_vis=1 the US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit issued an interesting opinion: "In January 2014, Anka Miscevic ("Anka") killed her husband, Zeljko Miscevic ("Zeljko"). At a state criminal proceeding, the court determined that Anka intended to kill Zeljko without legal justification. However, the court also determined that Anka was insane at the time of the killing and found her not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity. Following the criminal trial, the Laborers' Pension Fund (the "Fund") brought an interpleader action to determine the proper beneficiary of Zeljko's pension benefits. Anka claimed she was entitled to a Surviving Spouse Pension. The Estate of M.M. (Anka and Zeljko's child) argued that Anka was barred from recovering from the Fund by the Illinois slayer statute. After both parties filed motions seeking a judgment on the pleadings, the district court ruled in favor of the Estate of M.M. It determined that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, did not preempt the Illinois slayer statute, and that the statute barred even those found not guilty by reason of insanity from recovering from the deceased." Query: Who is the winner in this case? The pension that need not pay survivor annuity benefits to the insane wife. Query: Who are the losers? The insane wife who will not have income for her support, (and will most likely be incapable of finding employment except as an elected official), whoever will wind up paying for her future support - maybe the State? Query: Redeeming feature of the decision? A good discussion of Federal preemption under ERISA. See also the 2020 case of Prudential Insurance Company of America v. McFadden, Civil Action No. 6:19-CV-051-CHB, (USDC, ED Ky 2020) discussing Federal preemption - https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17925077709511382629&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=bY5nDLcAAAAJ:17102308171145443235:AAGBfm2dXJvPo0nUQKlDLqIPUBXxyXMitw&html= In Hartford Life Insurance Company v. LeCou, et al., No. CV 19-17-BLG-SPW, 2021 WL 1312516 (D. Mont. Apr. 8, 2021), the US District Court for the District of Montana considered whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) preempts the Montana Code Annotated § 72-2-813, which states that an individual who “feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits under this chapter [Chapter 2 UPC—Intestacy, Wills, and Donative Transfers] with respect to the decedent’s estate.” Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-813 (2). In this case, Cross-Claim Defendant Robert LeCou was convicted of deliberate homicide for killing his wife and two of her siblings. The sole issue for the court was whether the wife’s qualifying plan benefits pass to her estate under Montana’s slayer statute. It would not pass to her estate if the Montana statute were preempted by ERISA. The court noted that this issue has not been addressed by Montana’s Supreme Court or the 9th Circuit. It also noted, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001), explained that the underlying principle of slayer statutes and their uniformity across jurisdictions, leaned toward a finding that ERISA does not preempt such laws. Further, the Seventh Circuit in Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Miscevic, 880 F.3d 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2018) determined that Congress did not intend to supplant slayer statutes with ERISA because such statutes are a well-established legal principle that long-predates ERISA. “Congress could not have intended ERISA to allow one spouse to recover benefits after intentionally killing the other spouse.” Id. (citing Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (W.D. Va. 2005). Consistent with those decisions, the court found that ERISA does not preempt Montana Code Annotated § 72-2-813 (2). In Munger v. Intel Corporation, No. 3:22-cv-00263-HZ, United States District Court, D. Oregon, (October 5, 2023) - https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1046225108905078771&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt&hist=bY5nDLcAAAAJ:17102308171145443235:AFWwaea94w7XgMVkZLP-Q4RdIOLK&html=&pos=0&folt=kw discussed whether or not the California slayer law was preempted by ERISA and by the case of Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). But the real question is who has the burden of proof in your state? If the surviving spouse files suit the slayer statute would be an affirmative defense. The burden on the surviving spouse is show that the Participant is dead. A litigant is not required to disprove every possible explanation. The burden then shifts to the Plan to prove that he was a victim of a homicide by the surviving spouse that would then invoke the slayer statute. How will that happen under the facts of your case. The body was cremated. Any evidence of wrongdoing - bullet hole, knife wounds, crush injuries. Somebody needs to explain the situation to the coroner and urge him to make the call and issue a report. I have had friends that were taking blood thinners and fell and hit their heads on a piece of furniture and died of a cerebral hemorrhage. David

If they were all NHCEs you can probably self correct by retroactive amendment to conform the document to the actual match contributed for the Plan year if they all got more than the match formula even if it's not uniform since with will clearly be non discriminatory if the extra natch only when to NHCEs.

Is there anything in this particular plan document that says a loan becomes payable in full immediately upon the employee becoming a union member (or more generally, transferring to an excluded class of employees)? Usually I would only see that kind of provision apply upon termination of employment, but I suppose it could happen. Absent that, I don't think so. The employee continues to repay it through payroll deduction (assuming that's what the loan policy says). Transferring to an excluded class means you are not entitled to future contributions. Loan repayments are not contributions.

The benefit would be frozen at the 415 limit at the time of termination. I think there is an exception which rarely (if ever) applies to small plans that allows increases as part of a general COLA provision for retirees. I'd have to research it to double check, but I believe that may be possible. But from what you describe, it is almost certainly frozen at the limit in effect at termination of employment.