Search the News Archive

Text of Third Circuit Opinion: District Court's Order Remanding to Plan Administrator Was Not Appealable (PDF)

"Santander and Liberty Mutual appealed to this Court, but Stevens moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the District Court's remand order to the plan administrator was not a 'final decision' appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 at that time. Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must determine whether the District Court's remand order is presently final and appealable under Section 1291 or is otherwise appealable. Upon review, we hold that the District Court has retained jurisdiction over the case and that the order from which appellants have appealed is not yet appealable. We therefore will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction." [Stevens v. Santander Holdings USA Inc. Self Insured Short Term Disability Plan, No. 14-1481 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015)]

Text of Third Circuit Opinion: Evidence of Fixed Policy of Denying Benefits Is Sufficient to Demonstrate Futility of Administrative Appeals (PDF)

"The Employees misconstrue the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement when they argue that, because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, United bears the burden of proving that it would not be futile... The failure of Hane's appeal, the existence of a fixed policy denying benefits as evidenced by the correspondence between Loughlin and the many TVPs with letters in the record, and the absence of any evidence before us to suggest that an appeal from Loughlin's letter was anything other than time wasted, lead us to conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying the futility exception to the exhaustion requirement[.]" [Cottillion v. United Refining Co., No. 13-4633 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 2015)]

Third Circuit Affirms Tax Court in Disallowance of VEBA Deductions in Neonatology Associates Case (PDF)

19 pages. Excerpt: Our examination of the record convinces us that the contributions at the heart of this dispute were so far in excess of the cost of annual life insurance protection that they could not plausibly qualify as ordinary and necessary business expenses in accordance with I.R.C. section 162. As correctly recognized by the Tax Court, these contributions were taxable disguised dividends and not deductible expenses.

Text of Third Circuit Opinion: Employee-Paid Supplemental Coverage Is Subject to ERISA as Part of Employer-Sponsored Disability Plan (PDF)

"All of the characteristics of the Basic Policies and Supplemental Coverage indicate that they are not two separate sources of coverage, but two parts of one broader benefits plan. All of the Basic Policies and Supplemental Coverage were governed by a single group contract between [the employer] and Prudential.... [We] hold that the Supplemental Coverage cannot be unbundled from the Basic Plans. In so holding, we join every Court of Appeals to have considered whether to unbundle closely related components of an employer's broader ERISA benefits plan and declined to do so.... The plaintiffs' claims fall into three broad categories ... In the circumstances presented here, ERISA preempts all three sets of claims." [Menkes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, No. 13-1408 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2014)]

Religious Hospital Ineligible for Church Plan Exemption, Third Circuit Rules

"Only a church -- and not a religious hospital -- can establish a church plan that is exempt from the notice and funding requirements of [ERISA], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled. The Dec. 29 ruling is the first by a federal appeals court to consider the scope of ERISA's church plan exemption ... Affirming the lower court ruling, the Third Circuit rejected virtually every argument presented by Saint Peter's that the plan was a church plan." [Kaplan v. St. Peter's Healthcare System, No. 15-1172 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2015)]

Text of Third Circuit Opinion Delineating Threshold for Catalyst Theory Recovery of Attorney's Fees (PDF)

"To succeed under a catalyst theory of recovery, evidence that judicial activity encouraged the defendants to settle is not necessary. All that is necessary is that litigation activity pressured a defendant to settle or render to a plaintiff the requested relief.... [A] party is eligible for attorney's fees where his or her litigation efforts resulted in a voluntary, non-trivial, and more than procedural victory that is apparent to the court without the need to conduct a lengthy inquiry into whether that success was substantial or occurred on a central issue." [Templin v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 13-4493 (3d Cir. May 8, 2015)]

Text of Third Circuit Opinion: Government of Virgin Islands Not Obligated to Fund Employees' Pension Plan (PDF)

118 pages. "[The district court] determined that the consent judgment does not require the GVI to fund GERS for the delta between its assets and liabilities. We, too, find no anchor for this sweeping duty GERS seeks to impose on the GVI ... Even were we to cut that obligation on a rationale made of whole cloth, the system would remain insolvent. The citizens of the United States Virgin Islands -- population 106,405 -- simply cannot pay the necessary billions. The cure for GERS's chronic underfunding is not judicial but legislative[.]" [Government Employees Retirement System (GERS) of Virgin Islands v. Government of Virgin Islands (GVI), Nos. 20-1749, 20-1766 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2021)]

Third Circuit Joins Sister Circuits in 'Employer' Definition Under Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act

"[T]he U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, under [the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1974 (MPPAA)], a MPPAA employer includes any entity that is obligated to contribute to a plan as either a direct employer or in the interest of one. Adopting this consensus definition of other circuit courts, the court upheld a potential withdrawal liability award in an amount more than double the amount the contractor earned for seven-plus years' work on the related project." [J. Supor & Son Trucking & Rigging Co. v. Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, No. 20-3286 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2022)]

Third Circuit Opinion Permitting Exclusion of Hourly Employees from ERISA Pension Plan (PDF)

Bauer v. Summit Bancorp, No. 01-3624 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 2003). Excerpt: The Plan in this appeal is what has commonly been referred to over the last thirty years as a 'salaried-only plan.' Such a plan covers salaried employees of Summit and its subsidiaries, who are age 21 and above, and, who have completed one year of service. By its terms, Summit hourly employees are not eligible to participate in the Plan.

Third Circuit OKs Administrator's Interpretation of Disability Setoff Language to Include RRB Benefits (PDF)

10 pages; McElroy v. SmithKline Beecham Health & Welfare Benefits Trust Plan for U.S. Employees, No. 02-3421 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2003). FindLaw.com"s summary: 'In a disability benefits case challenging an ERISA plan administrator's interpretation of the plan, the administrator's conclusion, that certain Railroad Retirement Board disability benefits should be deducted from plaintiff"s long-term disability payments, was reasonable.