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The "somewhere" you're thinking of is Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)(4)-11(g)(4). This section provides rules for retroactively amending a plan after the end of the plan year to correct a failure of nondiscrimination or coverage testing. If the allocation made under the terms of the plan document satisfies coverage and nondiscrimination, then there is no need to invoke -11(g).

HCE, returning to your query: “We have been asked if we can process a QDRO provided to us after the death of the [alternate payee].” If a court order that might be a domestic-relations order is submitted to an ERISA-governed retirement plan’s administrator, that the order is submitted after a proposed alternate payee’s death might not, by itself, excuse the administrator from responsibility to decide whether the order is a DRO and, if so, a QDRO. The more challenging questions are: If an order specifies payments to an alternate payee who is no longer alive, is the order a QDRO? If an order specifies payments to an alternate payee’s named beneficiary or other successor-in-interest, is the order a QDRO? If a DRO may specify a successor-in-interest for an alternate payee’s portion, must the successor be someone who qualifies as the participant’s spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent? If the administrator finds that the order’s payee otherwise could be a proper alternate payee, does the order specify the name and mailing address of that alternate payee? If the administrator finds that the order’s payee could be a proper alternate payee, might the order otherwise fail to qualify because it calls for “[a] type or form of benefit, or [an] option, not otherwise provided under the plan”? Beyond carefully reading the plan and the statute, an administrator might want its lawyer’s advice. Further, whether the administrator’s decision is thumbs-up or thumbs-down, an administrator might explain in a careful writing, whether immediately furnished to claimants or not, a thorough reasoning for the decision. Such a writing might improve the administrator’s defenses on a challenge. (A challenge might come from the participant or a would-be alternate payee, whichever is disappointed or frustrated by the administrator’s decision).

You can't use your HSA for expenses prior to your eligibility. Only for those occuring after your account opened. If you are Medicare eligible, that may be cheaper than what you have now. You can enroll in Medicare and still work.

When did the failure occur? There is a special correction for auto enrollment failures that is 0% as long as the correct deferrals start within 9½ months after the end of the plan year, and a notice is provided.

The answer is "yes" if your plan is subject to ERISA: Although it used to be otherwise, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 changed the landscape dramatically. “29 CFR 2530.206 - Time and order of issuance of domestic relations orders (a) Scope. This section implements section 1001 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 by clarifying certain timing issues with respect to domestic relations orders and qualified domestic relations orders under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. * * * * * (c) Timing. (1) Subject to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a domestic relations order shall not fail to be treated as a qualified domestic relations order solely because of the time at which it is issued. (2) The rule described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section is illustrated by the following examples: Example 1. Orders issued after death. Participant and Spouse divorce, and the administrator of Participant's plan receives a domestic relations order, but the administrator finds the order deficient and determines that it is not a QDRO. Shortly thereafter, Participant dies while actively employed. A second domestic relations order correcting the defects in the first order is subsequently submitted to the plan. The second order does not fail to be treated as a QDRO solely because it is issued after the death of the Participant." (Emphasis supplied.) See Thomas v. Sutherland at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1601430218420084129&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr where the U.S. District Court in Utah held: "Although there is no case law precisely on point, the supporting material suggests that this is the appropriate result. The Code of Federal Regulations provides that a DRO does not fail to be treated as a QDRO solely because of the time at which it is issued. 29 C.F.R. 2530.206(c)(1). This includes orders issued after the participant's death, and occasions where a divorced spouse no longer meets the technical definition of a "surviving spouse" under the terms of the plan. 29 C.F.R. 2530.206(c)(1)(ex. 1 & 2). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has found that a domestic relations order can be qualified posthumously if notice is given and the order is filed during the eighteen-month period permitted under ERISA to secure a QDRO. Hogan v. Raytheon, 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002). Although different than the case at hand, the trend has been to enforce the terms of an otherwise valid QDRO as it was intended to be enforced, so long as notice was given and the order was filed during the period permitted under ERISA." (Emphasis supplied.) See also, Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, 788 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) where the Court held that two nunc pro tunc Orders issued after the death of the Participant were valid QDROs. Said the Court: “Domestic relations orders entered after the death of the plan participant can be QDROs. In the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress made clear that a QDRO will not fail solely because of the time at which it is issued, see Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1001, 120 Stat. 780 (2006), although several of our sister circuits had already reached that conclusion, see, e.g., Files v. Exxon Mobil Pension Plan, 428 F.3d 478, 490-91 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that a posthumous order constituted a QDRO), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1160 (2006); Patton v. Denver Post Corp., 326 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2003) (same); Hogan v. Raytheon Co., 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (same); Trs. of Dirs. Guild of Am.-Producer Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 421-23 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).” (Emphasis supplied.) Note that OPM will not honor a FERS or CSRS Court Order Acceptable for Processing entered after the death of the Employee. The same is true with respect to Military Retired Pay Division Orders and Foreign Service Pension System Orders. State, County and Municipal Plans and other Plans not subject to ERISA may or may not honor post mortem or posthumous Retirement Benefits Orders, but many do, some using a nunc pro tunc approach. See the following cases: Patton v. Denver Post Corp., 326 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir.2003) Robinette v. Hunsecker, 212 Md.App. 76, 66 A.3d 1093, 293 Ed. Law Rep. 892, (2013) Griffin v. Griffin, 62 Va. App. 736, 753 S.E.2d 574 (2014) Rivera v. Lew, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, On Certification from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Case No. 14-SP-117, 99 A.3d 269 (2014) Patterson v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 845 F.3d 756 (USCA 6th Cir. 2017) Garcia-Tatupu v. NFL Player Retirement Plan, Civil Action No. 16-11131-DPW, United States District Court, D. Massachusetts (2017) that you can find at: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13784574282734726035&hl=en&lr=lang_en&as_sdt=20006&as_vis=1&oi=scholaralrt. Files v. ExxonMobil Pension Plan, 428 F. 3d 478 (Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2005) David S. Goldberg

As Bri mentions, it's pretty common to allow loan rollovers in this situation. It's simple in theory, but the logistics can be challenging (for example, rolling over the loans before the cure period expires, especially if the recordkeeper requires 45-60 days to terminate the plan and will not allow individual distributions before then; catching up any missed payments during the transition; re-amortizing if the seller's and buyer's payroll periods differ (every two weeks vs. twice a month); setting up loan repayment deductions with the buyer; etc.).

Sure - many plans allow loan balances to be rolled over, even if they become due and payable upon termination of employment upon a separation from service with the plan sponsor. (And yeah - definitely make sure the buyer and its plan are cool with accepting such a rollover and can arrange for a new payroll deduction agreement, etc.)

It may help to break out the two entities involved as well. The corporation itself still exists; it simply has a new owner. The ESOP is not the plan sponsor; the corporation is. The corporation is created under state law, which as Peter notes generally requires that a corporation have at least one officer. (For example, one state I do work in specifies two different offices that must be filled, but they can be filled by the same person.) The corporation is still the entity employing employees, conducting business, etc. The corporation has a board of directors; the ESOP does not. Even after being sold to an ESOP, the corporation is under the control of the corporation's board of directors (who generally are appointed by the ESOP trustee in the trustee's capacity as the sole shareholder). The people you are looking for will be at this level. The ESOP is a retirement plan sponsored by the corporation. The ESOP is the corporation's sole shareholder. It has a trustee, administrator, etc., but generally would not have officers, employees, or a board of directors. From there, I think Peter's comment will help you figure out which individuals are officers for this particular issue.

Consider this: T-13 Q. For purposes of defining a key employee, who is an officer? A. Whether an individual is an officer shall be determined upon the basis of all the facts, including, for example, the source of his authority, the term for which elected or appointed, and the nature and extent of his duties. Generally, the term officer means an administrative executive who is in regular and continued service. The term officer implies continuity of service and excludes those employed for a special and single transaction. An employee who merely has the title of an officer but not the authority of an officer is not considered an officer for purposes of the key employee test. Similarly, an employee who does not have the title of an officer but has the authority of an officer is an officer for purposes of the key employee test. In the case of one or more employers treated as a single employer under sections 414(b), (c), or (m), whether or not an individual is an officer shall be determined based upon his responsibilities with respect to the employer or employers for which he is directly employed, and not with respect to the controlled group of corporations, employers under common control or affiliated service group. A partner of a partnership will not be treated as an officer for purposes of the key employee test merely because he owns a capital or profits interest in the partnership, exercises his voting rights as a partner, and may, for limited purposes, be authorized and does in fact act as an agent of the partnership. The next Q&A, T-14, states: “There is no minimum number of officers that must be taken into account.” But the reasoning in T-13 suggests that the minimum is one, even if the one might not be a human or might not be a plan-eligible employee. The trustees or other fiduciaries of the ESOP might not, because of that role, be officers of the ESOP-owned corporation or company. But somehow the organization must have a way to operate. Someone—although he, she, or it might not be an employee—has authority to obligate the corporation or company. Also, T-15 explains that an organization other than a corporation has officers (in the sense provided for the top-heavy rule). 26 C.F.R. § 1.416-1 https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/chapter-I/subchapter-A/part-1/subject-group-ECFR686e4ad80b3ad70/section-1.416-1

Who is "us" in this scenario? Plan administrator? TPA? Recordkeeper? Was the DRO accepted as qualified before the death of the alternate payee? Does the DRO itself address what happens if the alternate payee dies before the distribution date?