joel

This is Joel's pattern, which is why very few get sucked into his "discussions". Pax: about now you must feel as foolish as vebaguru.

No, on the contrary it took many hours to finish it. I trust I haven't wasted my time in answering you.

Please read my post again, I used the term "401(k) type". I use "401(k) type" because it has become the most popular type of DC plan and most observers would recognize it. Specifically the Plan at hand use to come under section 403(b) but was changed a couple of years ago to section 401(a)

JOEL L. FRANK Retirement Analyst PO Box 148 Marlboro, New Jersey 07746-0148 732-536-9472 Email: rollover@optonline.net MEMORANDUM September 2006 Public Retirement Planning “Defined Contribution” and “Defined Benefit” Plans For more than 40 years the State of New York has administered a Defined Contribution (401(k) type) retirement plan (the Optional Retirement Program) as a primary retirement benefit for the administrative/professional staffs at the State and City Universities, (SUNY-CUNY). In fact this select group of employees is given a choice of plans with the other one being a Defined Benefit pension. The selection is made, not by the state, not by the unions but by the individual. This identical choice of plans should be offered to the entire public employee workforce in New York. Any intelligent dialogue about solving the multi-billion dollar funding problem of public employee pensions in New York must include a discussion about offering a choice of plans, Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution. The unions’ position goes something like: “Defined Contribution Plans have a number of attributes that limit their applicability to most state and local public employees, although they are suitable for higher education professionals. Defined Contribution plans place all of the investment risk on the individual. Hence, they are best for employees who can bear that risk because they have other assets and who are knowledgeable about investment alternatives.” This assertion is utter nonsense and highly insulting to the hundreds of thousands of public employees who do not work for SUNY-CUNY. Prior to allowing the higher education employee to join the Defined Contribution Optional Retirement Program does the state require the employee to file a net worth statement and take a financial literacy test in order to evaluate his or her “knowledge about investment alternatives”? Of course not! Prior to 1964 higher education employees in this State belonged to a State-administered Defined Benefit pension system just like all other public employees. As a group higher education personnel are more mobile than other career civil servants and, as will be shown in this Memorandum, the Defined Benefit system is hurtful to such employees. The Defined Contribution system, on the other hand, is ideal for the employee who has had several employers during a career of service or just one. The Defined Contribution plan is not reserved for the higher education community because they have “other assets” and are “knowledgeable about investment alternatives”. Career mobility is the sole reason why higher education personnel are furnished with a choice of plans: Defined Contribution or Defined Benefit. When it comes to choosing the type of retirement plan one size does not fit all. The choice of plan is best left to the individual based on his or her personal circumstances and work pattern. The Defined Contribution approach may very well be “suitable” for the person that cleans the office of the Professor of Greek Mythology but “unsuitable” for the Professor. The State of Florida has come to this conclusion by offering a choice of plans to its entire public employee workforce. http://www.myfrs.com/content/index.html. New York should do the same. Each type of plan has a different impact on a participant’s total compensation, career mobility, and retirement income. The Defined Contribution Plan This type of plan makes its pension commitments to participants in the form of monthly contributions that are a stated percentage of current salary. The employer’s contributions, along with those of the employee, are deposited each month to the individual retirement investment account of each participant, as are the investment earnings on the accumulating contributions. For the Defined Contribution plan illustrated in this Memorandum, contributions are 12% of salary, with 7% paid by the employer and 5% by the employee. (Under the assumptions used, this rate of contribution provides a retirement income of about the same amount as the Defined Benefit plan illustrated after a career of participation.) During the working years, all funds contributed to a Defined Contribution plan accumulate with investment earnings, and at the time of retirement may be used to provide an annuity income based on the amount of the accumulation. Age, of course, has a material effect on life expectancy and therefore on the rate of monthly pay-out. The younger the age of retirement, the smaller the monthly income per $1,000 of accumulation, because the longer the number of years over which payments will be made. The Defined Benefit Plan This type of plan provides that if an employee stays with one employer until retirement, he or she will receive a monthly single-life income equal to a specified percentage of the average salary paid by the employer in the years just prior to retirement, e.g., 50% of final-5-year average salary at age 65, after a career of service. The monthly single-life income is therefore the same for all who have identical salary and service histories. The accumulation needed to pay the income is determined by the age, salary and service of the person. The Defined Benefit plan in the illustrations that follow provides that for each year of participation the plan will pay a retirement income at age 65 equal to 1.5% of the average salary paid the employee during the final five years of participation in the plan. This formula therefore promises that after 35 years with one employer the participant will receive a retirement income equal to 52.5% of final-5-year average salary. Pension Contributions as Deferred Compensation It is revealing to compare the two plans in terms of how much they add to a participant’s total compensation each year. Under the Defined Contribution plan illustrated, employer contributions of 7% of salary are credited to the participant’s retirement account each month along with the participant’s own contributions of 5%. Each month the employer is therefore adding 7% of salary as deferred compensation to each person’s account. A Defined Benefit plan is more difficult to pin down in terms of how much it adds to a person’s compensation each year. Although employer costs are often expressed as a percentage of salary, e.g., “7% of covered payroll,” this over-all percentage is rarely indicative of the value of pension benefits earned by any individual in the plan. Instead, the cost of the defined benefit earned by a year’s work depends on a person’s age, salary, and years of participation in the plan. If the plan is contributory, participants contribute a stated percentage (5% in the illustration), just as in Defined Contribution plans. But the employer’s share of the cost varies substantially from person to person, adding little or nothing to a younger person’s compensation, and adding a great deal with advancing age and long-term participation in the plan. This is shown in Table I, which illustrates the contribution pattern required to keep each type of plan fully funded for a person who enters at age 30 and stays with one employer until age 65. Assumptions All of the Tables are based on the following assumptions: · Salary is $8,000 a year at age 30, increasing by 4% a year to an average of $28,107 a year between ages 60 and 65. · The Defined Benefit plan provides that a person who enters at age 30 and stays with one employer until age 65 will receive a retirement income of 52.5% of the final-5-year average salary, or $14,756 a year for life. · The level contribution rate for the Defined Contribution plan (12% of salary) was selected because under the stated assumptions it too will provide a single life annuity of approximately the same amount at age 65. · Both plans provide full and immediate vesting and the full accumulation value is assumed to be payable to the participant’s family if he or she dies before retirement. · Employee contributions are 5% of salary for both plans. · The investment return is 5% for both plans. Table I Contributions as Per Cent of Salary Employee’s Employee Employer Contribution Employer Contribution Attained Age Contributions Defined Contribution Defined Benefit Either Plan Plan Approach ________________________________________________________________________ 30 5% 7% -2.18% 35 5 7 -0.99 40 5 7 1.02 45 5 7 3.86 50 5 7 7.83 55 5 7 13.38 60 5 7 21.06 64 5 7 29.27 Under the Defined Benefit plan illustrated, the younger employee’s own 5% contributions are more than enough, with anticipated interest earnings, to cover the full cost of the defined benefits earned at the younger ages, and to cover most of the cost until nearly age 50. Thereafter, for a participant who remains at one employer throughout a career, the employer’s share of the cost rises rapidly with advancing age and long service, because each year’s pension commitment includes not only (a) the cost of the current year’s 1.5% benefit, based on the most recent five years’ average salary, but also (b) the additional cost of updating all previously earned benefits to the latest 5-year average salary. This results in deferring most of the employer’s pension commitment for an individual to the final years of long service, as shown. For example, in the Table I illustration about 85% of the employer’s cost under the Defined Benefit plan is deferred until after the 25th year of participation, between the participant’s age 55 and 65. This deferral has the unfortunate effect of making a disproportionate part of a person’s lifetime compensation contingent on age and fealty to one employer. Deferred funding also works to the disadvantage of those who participate at the younger ages but leave the work force during the middle years, say to raise a family. They take little or no deferred compensation with them when they leave, and their re-entry problems, if they later return to work, are exacerbated by the high pension costs at the older ages. A Defined Benefit plan also has worrisome implications for an employer’s budgeting and salary administration, especially during periods of salary inflation. For example, under the Defined Benefit plan illustrated, each salary increase of $1,000 at age 60 carries with it a pension cost of approximately $5,800 between ages 60 and 65. Death Benefit Prior to Retirement It is also interesting to compare the amount that accumulates on behalf of each participant during the working years. Under Defined Contribution plans the accumulated funds are payable to the participant’s beneficiary if the participant dies prior to retirement. Under the Defined Benefit system, any employer funding on behalf of an employee is forfeited upon death prior to retirement. The funds revert to the pension plan and help pay the employer’s pension costs for other participants. But Table II shows the combined amounts of accumulated employer and employee contributions at 5-year intervals, and assumes that under both plans the full amount would be payable to the beneficiary or estate of a participant who remains at one employer until the ages shown and then dies. Table II Accumulated Death Benefit Prior to Retirement (Assuming participant remains at one employer until death at age shown) Age Defined Contribution Plan Defined Benefit Plan Attained at Time of Death 30 $ 953 $ 223 35 7,166 1,951 40 16,476 5,621 45 30,066 12,846 50 49,521 26,495 55 76,964 51,545 60 115,225 96,572 64 156,115 156,523 Retirement Income and Career Mobility The effect of career mobility on the end product of each plan also bears examining. A person who moves among several employers having identical Defined Contribution plans will reach retirement with the same level of retirement income that would have been produced staying at one of the employer’s for an entire career. On the other hand, a person who moves among several employers having identical Defined Benefit plans will reach retirement with substantially less retirement income than by staying at one of these employers for an entire career. Consider Jack and Jill. Jack is covered from age 30 to age 65 by the 12% Defined Contribution plan illustrated. He will receive $14,718 a year at age 65, or about 52.4 percent of his final-5-year average salary whether he remains at one employer throughout his career or moves among several employers having identical plans. Jill is covered by the Defined Benefit plan illustrated, and if she stays at one employer from age 30 to age 65 she will receive a retirement income of $14,756 a year, or 52.5% of final-5-year average salary. But if, for example, she changes employers at age 40 and again at age 50, remaining at the third employer until age 65, her retirement income will be $10,246, even though all three institutions have identical Defined Benefit plans and provide full and immediate vesting. This occurs because when she leaves an employer the defined benefits earned at that employer are related to the participant’s 5-year average salary just before leaving, not to the 5-year average salary just before retirement. The “cold storage vesting” of Defined Benefit plans provides no way for vested benefits to increase between termination of employment and retirement. The calculation is shown below. Table III Average Salary Last 5 years Years at Each of Yearly Income Employer x Service x 1.5% = at age 65 Employer 1 $10,543 x 10 x .015 = $ 1,581 Employer 2 15,606 x 10 x .015 = 2,341 Employer 3 28,107 x 15 x .015 = 6,324 Total $ 10,246 Advantages of Each Plan The main advantage of a Defined Benefit plan is that it assures retiring employees with equal periods of service at a given employer a consistent ratio of retirement income to final average salary. And this ratio (although not the amount of retirement income) is predictable if it can be assumed that the employee will stay with a given employer until retirement. A major advantage of the Defined Contribution plan is that it adds a consistent and visible percentage of salary to each employee’s total compensation at the time the compensation is earned. If one person’s salary is more than another’s, the deferred compensation is greater by the same percentage, not warped out of proportion by age or length of service. This pattern of funding, unlike a pattern that defers most of the employer’s commitment to the final years of long service, helps keep the pension plan a neutral factor when the person is deciding about joining or leaving an employer (also when the employer is making the decision). Shouldn’t the individual have a full measure of benefits whether staying at one employer or moving among several? The Defined Contribution plan also has budgeting advantages for the employer. Pension costs are a constant percentage of salary each year. And the employer’s pension obligation for each person is fully and permanently funded at the time the obligation is incurred, not left as an open liability tied to whatever salary levels the future brings.

Assumptions: Salary reductions only. Fixed interest annuity. Does the amount borrowed come from the general assets of the insurer or the individual's annuity account balance?

If I am annoying anyone in the "audience" may I suggest you simply refrain from participation, observe and allow the other attendees to respond. The DC plan known as the NJ Supplemental Annuity Collective Trust (SACT) has been operated internally since its inception in 1963. The DC Alternate Benefit Program has been operated externally since its inception at about the same time. Both are and have been no-load, very low cost programs. The State's 457 Plan since its inception about 25 years ago thru December 31, 2005 had been operated internally at no-load and low cost. The State is not new to sponsoring DC plans and when they have they always emphasized no-load and low cost. Q.: Why was the fundamental principle of no-load and low cost abandoned with the 457 Plan?

mjb: You could not be more wrong. The state has decided to retain the services of outside managers for just a portion of the Defined Benefit assets. Having said that, are the fees associated with this oursourcing 12 times higher than what it cost the state to manage the assets internally? Of course not! So why did the state feel its ok to outsource the 457 Plan with a fee structure 12 times higher than when the assets were managed internally?

MJB: Your post is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Your post refers to the State's Defined Benefit pension plans not plans funded by the voluntary salary reductions of its employees which, as you know, are Defined Contribution plans. MJB, more to the point: As you know the Alternate Benefit Program of the State of New Jersey is a Defined Contribution Plan to which the pedagogues at the public institutuions of higher education must belong. For 40 years they have been mandated into this Program in lieu of membership in the Defined Benefit system. The state contributes 8 percent of salary into the individually owned investment account while the employee contributes 5 percent. The investment provider is an organization by the name of Teachers Insurance and Annutiy Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), a no-load investment provider. Q.: Recognizing that the Deferred Compensation Board did not want to administer its Plan any longer why didn't it retain its low cost emphasis and contract with a low cost provider?

George: Your're begging the question: If the separate account structure with very low fees was in place for 25 years without a union demand for change why did the state unilaterally change it?

George: 25 years ago when the state established the Plan there was even less, IF ANY, union involvement in the design of the Plan yet the state adopted the separate account structure with very low fees.

To repeat there were no state subsidies in the old Plan. The participant paid 0.06 percent for administration and 0.02 percent for investment management. Other low cost plans where the employee pays all costs is the Federal TSP, Investment Plan of the Florida Retirement System and the NYC 457 Plan. These plans have one thing in common...a separate account structure with institutional pricing which is exactly what was practiced for 25 years by the NJ Deferred Compensation Board prior to January 2, 2006. Why the sudden change in policy?

Under the old Plan investment management fees were 0.02 percent with the administrative fee being 0.06 percent.

George, for your review: Prior to the implementation of the Plan on January 2, 2006, the Union representing State employees expressed its opposition to the Plan. Apparently unsuccessful in its attempt to negotiate a better deal for the participants, the Union filed a grievance against the State of NJ. The Arbitrator ruled in favor of the State. Joel George: So let's assume there is a baker's dozen of unions representing NJ state employees. Would not the result be the same? Other than filing a formal grievance which led to the Arbitrator's decision what else would you have suggested as first steps to all 13 unions prior to January 2, 2006?

This Plan is for state employees only. Locals may not opt in. As stated previously all costs were borne by the participant. This plan was cost neutral to the state. Now that the TPA is a private company we must add on something you guys forgot...profit.

But the Arbitrator's decision applies to all the participants in the Plan.

George: Prior to the implementation of the Plan on January 2, 2006, the Union representing State employees expressed its opposition to the Plan. Apparently unsuccessful in its attempt to negotiate a better deal for the participants, the Union filed a grievance against the State of NJ. The Arbitrator ruled in favor of the State. Joel

Prior to January 2, 2006 the New Jersey State Employees Deferred Compensation Plan (NJSEDCP) was administered by the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits with the New Jersey Division of Investments and the State Investment Council responsible for investment of the funds. The Plan is funded solely with voluntary employee salary reductions with the employee responsible for paying all costs associated with the administration of the Plan. The Plan offered four investment funds (DCP Funds) each with an expense ratio of 0.08 percent (eight basis points). On a national level only the Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) offers a more cost effective retirement savings/planning tool. This all changed on January 2, 2006 when Draconian changes were introduced. The State's Deferred Compensation Board appointed Prudential Financial as the Plan’s Third Party Administrator (TPA). The new investment lineup comprises 23 investment funds with expense ratios as high as 1.45 percent (145 basis points). The lowest cost fund, the Vanguard Institutional Index Fund with an expense ratio of 0.25 percent (25 basis points), is more than three times as expensive as any one of the four DCP Funds. On January 2, 2006 the DCP Funds were closed to future contributions. If the participant had not given Prudential Financial new investment instructions as to which new funds he or she wished to invest in Prudential Financial made the decision by default. DCP Equity Fund investors are now investing their current contributions in Large Cap Blend Enhanced Index/QM Fund with an expense ratio of 0.89 percent (89 basis points). DCP Bond Fund investors are now paying 0.80 percent (80 basis points) to invest in Core Bond Enhanced Index/PIM Fund and DCP Small Cap Equity Fund investors are now investing half their allocation in Mid Cap Blend Enhanced Index/QM Fund and half in Small Cap Value/Munder Capital Fund with expense ratios of 0.94 percent (94 basis points) and 1.35 percent (135 basis points) respectively. Assume a participant invested equally in the three DCP Funds. On January 2, 2006 his/her expense ratio was increased nearly 12 fold to 0.94 percent (94 basis points). Assume an average investment return of 8 percent over the next 30 years. A DCP investor who starts off with $30,000 on January 2, 2006 (with no additional contributions) will have an account balance of $295,000 on January 2, 2036 while the "new investor", who also starts off with $30,000, will have an account balance of $232,000. Such are the results of paying 0.86 percent (86 basis points) in additional fees over a 30-year period. This cannot be defended! This is a bad, really bad deal. An investor cannot control the investment markets but can control the cost of investing in those markets. Prior to January 2, 2006 the Deferred Compensation Board, Division of Pensions and Benefits, Division of Investments and the State Investment Council all keenly recognized this important principle of investing. It had served the employee very well for 25 years. Why was it suddenly abandoned? A cruel injustice has been inflicted on New Jersey State employees and must be corrected forthwith. Joel L. Frank

You may want to give serious consideration to a menu of no-load Target Date funds and "fagetaboutit" Joel

Yes and yes.

================================================================ Pax: My second post in this thread was pure commentary...do you have any? Joel

On June 13, 2006, after many months of investigating the New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and its Member Benefits unit, the Attorney General of the State of New York found that since 1989 the Member Benefits unit has continuously violated the law by not disclosing that the unit was selling/marketing to NYSUT members an ING variable annuity called “Opportunity Plus”. (http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/jun/jun13b_06.html NYSUT President Richard Iannuzzi, on June 13, 2006 wrote to NYSUT members: “It is clear now the Trust, despite its best intentions, could have - and should have - historically provided greater disclosure of the fees paid to the Trust by ING and more regularly reviewed investment options. Mistakes were made. They will not be made again.” 403(b) investing was first made available to public school employees in 1961 and from that date forward New York’s public school personnel have been infested with high cost investment products. Since 1989 the NYSUT has been the primary player in the marketing/selling of these high cost 403(b) investments to public school personnel. Thanks to NYSUT there is currently more than $2.3 billion dollars invested in the “Opportunity Plus” Variable Annuity. Prior to 1989, when the illicit business agreement was first entered into with ING’s predecessor Aetna, the NYSUT knew full well that teachers outside the City were being flooded with commissioned based variable annuities for their 403b investing. They also knew that the State and City Universities were using the no-load firm, Teachers’ Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) for their 403(b) investing and that City public school employees, about 40 percent of the NYSUT membership, were never infested with high cost products but used the no-load Teachers’ Retirement System for their 403(b) investing. Moreover, NYSUT was sponsoring for THEIR OWN EMPLOYEES a no-load 401(k) Plan. THEY ALSO KNEW THAT IN ALL THE AFOREMENTIONED CASES THE UNION COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE IN THE COMMISSIONS BEING PAID BY THEIR MEMBERS BECAUSE THEIR MEMBERS WERE NOT PAYING COMMISSIONS. In this backdrop they embarked on their illegal “silent partnership” with Aetna/ING. The Member Benefits unit couldn’t wait to receive their first commission/fee check. In my view no mistakes were made by Richard Iannuzzi and his cohorts. They knew exactly what they were doing. They were simply caught. They understood extremely well that the success of collecting these commission/fees on a regular basis was fully dependent on its CONCEALMENT. If their competitors got wind of it, it would be used against them and rightfully so. Moreover, what teacher in his/her right mind would buy a variable annuity after being told that some of the commissions/fees he/she was paying was being shared with their Union? It was only after knowing that Mr. Spitzer’s office was investigating insurance and retirement products did Mr. Iannuzzi and his crowd decide to disclose the commission/fee arrangement. Of note: Prior to signing the marketing/endorsement agreement in 1989, all the major 403b vendors recommended to NYSUT that no vendor be endorsed. NYSUT would not hear of it. Its mouth was watering for some of those lucrative commissions being paid by its members. It’s that simple. So to anyone who is buying Mr. Iannuzzi’s statement, I have a bridge I would like to sell to you. A NYSUT member wrote the following: “THERE NEEDS TO BE A LESSON TAUGHT TO NYSUT/ING FOR ALLOWING 55,OOO MEMBERS TO BE FLEECED. THERE WERE NO GOOD INTENTIONS HERE AS EVIDENCED BY THE LOW COST PLAN NYSUT MAKES AVAILABLE TO ITS OWN EMPLOYEES. SOME SIMPLE MATH SUGGESTS OUR MEMBERS PAID FEES GREATER THAN $100 MILLION. NYSUT’S DECISION TO SELL US TO ING IS AT BEST A BETRAYAL AND AT WORST CRIMINAL. THIS WILL NOT BE OVER UNTIL THERE IS A FULL ACCOUNTING EITHER BY A CLASS ACTION OR A REFUNDING OF FEES TO ALL BY UNION BROTHERS AND SISTERS.” B.N.

James; What course of action did you follow?

Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 Department of Law The State Capitol Albany, NY 12224 For More Information: 518-473-5525 For Immediate Release June 13, 2006 NYSUT’S MEMBERS BENEFITS UNIT SETTLES PROBE Settlement is Part of Ongoing Investigation of Retirement Products Attorney General Eliot Spitzer today announced an agreement to resolve an investigation of the marketing of retirement products to members of the state’s largest teachers’ union. Under the agreement, an arm of the New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) will adopt a series of reforms and pay $100,000 to the state to cover costs of the investigation. The agreement follows a lengthy probe revealing that NYSUT’s Member Benefits unit accepted payments from an insurance company to promote the company’s retirement products to NYSUT members. The unit did not disclose this arrangement and, instead, took steps to conceal it. "A simple rule that my office has enforced time and time again is that fiduciaries must place the interests of their clients first," Spitzer said. "Accordingly, an office set up to counsel union members on retirement alternatives should always provide objective advice and full disclosure of relevant facts. That did not happen in this instance. But as result of this agreement, reforms have been adopted to ensure that this standard will be met in the future." The investigation revealed that a retirement product endorsed by the unit – a so-called 403(b) plan offered by the Dutch insurance giant ING and its predecessor, Aetna Life Insurance and Annuity Company– charged investors fees and expenses as high as 2.85 percent per year while delivering only limited benefits. The unit endorsed the plan (even though cheaper alternatives were available) in return for undisclosed payments of as much as $3 million per year. The unit took pains to hide this "silent partnership" with ING/Aetna. The unit would urge union members to attend financial planning seminars, claiming that: "There’s no sales pitch - they [the seminars] do not promote specific products or services." But contrary to this claim, the seminars were used as a "foot in the door" to promote ING/Aetna retirement products. In addition, the unit redirected calls it received arising from the retirement seminars to ING/Aetna employees, who answered the phones with their first names only. Callers thought they were talking to NYSUT benefits unit personnel when in fact they were talking to the insurance company’s marketing representatives. In late 2004, after it became aware of the Attorney General’s investigation of insurance and retirement products, the unit drafted a new disclosure policy, which was described by officials in an internal e-mail as moving from a "try to hid[e] it" approach to a more open approach that included disclosing all payments from ING. Under today’s agreement, the unit agrees to the following: Conduct open bidding for future retirement plan endorsements; Provide full disclosure of any and all payments from insurance companies; Allow members an opportunity to roll over savings to a new endorsed plan at no cost; Provide free and objective investment advice to members; and Hire an independent consultant to oversee reforms and report to the Attorney General’s office. More than 50,000 New York teachers and other school district employees bought into the retirement plan without having been told by the unit of the payments it received from ING/Aetna. The investigation underlying today’s settlement was conducted by Assistant Attorneys General Peter Dean and Harriet Rosen, under the direction of David D. Brown IV, Chief of the Attorney General’s Investment Protection Bureau. A broad investigation of the marketing of retirement products continues. Attachments: NYSUT AOD Exhibits --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A retiree must have worked 25 years as a public employee in NJ in order to have free health insurance. Joel

Joel: You can take your issues to the NJ attorney general. There is no reason for taxpayers to subsidize a 457 plan. mgb: You are all mixed-up! All fees are paid by the paricipants...the taxpayer pays ZERO! Any increase in fees is paid by the participant. Can you now think of a viable reason for the state's decision to farm out the plan to Prudential Financial?