QDROphile

I continue to be drawn to the divorce proceeding, including the domestic relations order (NOT the qualification of the order by the plan), in which B does not seem to have participated in the identification, valuation, or terms of division of the plan interest in the context of the larger division of property between A and B in the divorce proceeding. That is a state court matter in which there may have been ignorance, inattention, unfairness, deception, omission, or other skulduggery, or not. There is nothing* about federal QDRO rules that relates to what B “should” or could get from the plan in consequence of divorce. In fact, the plan is generally not supposed to have any concern for what happened in the state court and may/should look only at whether the proposed QDRO appears to be an actual domestic relations order. The alarm about A’s position and behavior relating to the plan (other than refusal to provide (1) benefit information necessary for fairly adjudicating or settling rights in the state court divorce proceeding, and (2) information about plan procedures) seems misguided, despite the bad optics relating to A. The bad things that may have happened — or things that should have happened and did not — probably happened (or not) in the state court. Which brings me back to, “What does B think B should be getting from the plan by way of benefits that B is not getting under the terms of the QDRO?” The answer probably relates to the terms of the domestic relation order — the product of the state court — not the qualification of the domestic relations order by the plan. *Well, almost nothing.

Please explain how you envision that this would work and what aspect is troubling the plan . I think it is fair for the plan to require a “split the payment” approach: fraction x amount of monthly (?) scheduled payment = amount of monthly (?) payment to alternate payee The plan can refuse to do the math (apply a verbal formula) to determine the fraction and require the order to state the fraction.

Santo Gold might also ask: What is my Company’s responsibility with regard to determining the answers to the relevant questions or simply following instructions (other than determining whether or not there is a service agreement with anyone with respect to which the Company is obligated)? Are the questions in the post a matter of curiosity or are they a matter of gaining some advice for making some judgments. decisions, or recommendations that will be passed on to a client?

Is there something that Person B thinks is wrong with what the purported QDRO awards to person B? Is there something that Person B thinks wrong with what the divorce decree (or whatever it is called in Wisconsin) awarded to person B? I am having difficulty with understanding what the real problem is (though I grant you that Person A is in a ticklish position and does not seem to be acting beyond reproach). If Person B thinks they are getting the wrong amount, then they either (1) file a claim under the plan's claims procedures (which will force the plan to give an explanation about the plan's position on qualification and interpretation of the order, with reference to plan and QDRO Procedures terms), or (2) go back to divorce court to amend that court's order (which will involve both Person A and Person B), write a new proposed QDRO that implements the now correct award, and submit the new proposed order to the plan for qualification. #1 will require an ERISA lawyer because claims get you into part of ERISA other than section 206(d)(3) and that is possibly the first step to yet another legal proceeding. #2 probably gets you both the divorce lawyer and the QDRO lawyer because it is essentially a do over -- and hopefully will be done right. The valuation date is not something that can be manipulated to screw anyone. A competent QDRO professional should be able to get to the amount (or a reasonable approximation) that the alternate payee is awarded in the divorce no matter how the plan frames valuation dates.

First, an overview observation, and then an attempt to give a helpful answer. As someone that you might refer to as a QDRO lawyer, I see a lot of information and query that I think is very unlikely to matter in terms of determining whether or not the domestic relations order is a QDRO, including different vintages of plan document. A 401(k) account is a relatively easy thing to divide from a qualification perspective, assuming conventional liquid assets. Plan terms usually have no substantial effect. Because of the excess of text that appears to be irrelevant, it seems that there is a lot of confusion. The confusion also appears involve identification of the relevant “fiduciary” or fiduciaries who will be responsible for cutting through all of the noise and making decisions about the domestic relations order as qualified or not. The usual circumstances relating to a QDRO involve two pieces: (1) what part of the 401(k) account will the alternate payee get? This has everything to do with the divorce settlement and not necessarily anything to do with the terms of the 401(k) plan (except maybe vesting). The plan is totally agnostic about what the alternate payee should receive, except that the alternate payee cannot receive an amount or type of benefit that the plan does not provide for (which is a qualification matter and almost never an issue with a 401(k) plan). For determining the amount that the alternate payee should receive in the greater scheme of things, the parties need domestic relations lawyers to come up with a domestic relations order that I will refer to as the “divorce decree” which may or may not be the domestic relations order that is submitted to the plan to end up with a QDRO (probably not; see the explanation below about the role of the QDRO lawyer). (2) A domestic relations order (DRO) must be submitted to the plan in order to tell the plan what the divorce decree specifies to be the interest in the plan awarded to the alternate payee. The DRO must set forth the information that the relevant statutes require, which neatly corresponds to the information that the plan administrator (or other QDRO fiduciary) actually needs to administer the DRO and give the alternate payee what the divorce decree has determined that the alternate payee should get. Unfortunately, a QDRO lawyer (or other competent professional) may be required to make sure that the formal qualification requirements are satisfied. A QDRO lawyer will be concerned with plan terms, but, as mentioned before, plan terms usually have little effect. An experienced QDRO lawyer can probably put together a perfectly good domestic relations order while being almost blind to plan terms — not that they actually would. A QDRO lawyer is indifferent to the settlement terms that relate to what the alternate payee “should” receive from a 401(k) plan as long as the “what” is expressed in the divorce decree as a dollar amount or a percentage of the account balance as of a particular date. Valuation dates may be a matter affected by plan terms, which gets us to: (3) A common arrangement is for the domestic relations lawyer to have an association of sorts with a QDRO lawyer (or other professional) to make sure that the divorce decree defines the alternate payee’s interest in the plan in a way that can be implemented by the plan, such as by specifying a valuation date that is workable for the plan. The QDRO lawyer then drafts a domestic relations order that meet the qualification requirements to become a QDRO. So, the answer to your question is: both, especially since there seems to be so much confusion about what matters or not, and people seem to be enmeshed in a probably unnecessary push/pull. I am not unmindful of the misfortune that something that is conceptually quite simple ends up needing the assistance of expensive professionals to make things “right” whether or not anyone is made happy. Important addendum: No mention has been made of an extremely important document that plans are required to have: written procedures on qualified domestic relations orders (QDRO Procedures). If I were to have only one document from the plan, that is the one that I would request. However, while that document should be the most important and informative of all plan documents, that document often sucks and will disappoint. The QDRO Procedures may be incorporated into an SPD.

Why is the individual involving the plan in the purchase rather than buying the ranch entirely with personal (non-plan) funds? In these types of propositions I am concerned that the individual is using plan funds to serve personal (non-plan) interests, such as enabling the purchase when the participant does not have enough money outside the plan to cover the purchase price. That fits my understanding of a prohibited transaction. I also think it is a set-up for future PTs and other problems as the ranch is operated. Is the plan capable of covering its share of potentially unlimited demands for more capital? Qualified plans are not meant to operate businesses.

What is your role/concern? Are you starting with skepticism that their income reporting is incorrect? What if it is incorrect?

How about a spin off and merger? I know there is a lot of queasiness about plan mergers, but I think the concerns tend to be exaggerated. Or just a spinoff, as suggested by Bill Presson. Spinoffs occur as of the spinoff date, no matter how much time it takes for asset transfer, plan documentation, and other administrative matters. Some dates are more difficult than others.

And what distribution amount from what source are you asking about?

State withholding is determined by state law and can vary from state to state. I know some states essentially adopted the federal tax code with respect to definitions, e.g. wages and gross income, and I suspect most states do. How many cookies do you available to award?

Not to aid and abet the actions that the client chooses to pursue that the advisor has declared unlawful? It depends. Inter alia, see “zugzwang” and, for fun, the definition of “lawyer” in The Devil’s Dictionary.

Last time, years ago, when I explained my aversion to naming the “employer” as plan administrator, I got pushback with the perfectly reasonable explanation that with respect to “small” employers my concerns were not well founded and my recommendations were impractical. A fair point. For sole proprietors, and some other businesses with a limited number of active owners, naming the employer as plan administrator is probably not worth much worry. I hope that those active owners understand that they are fiduciaries, and what that means, including potential personal liability. With respect to more complex businesses, the concerns are based on a corporate and agency law. To avoid need for a legal treatise, the practical question to address when the employer is the plan administrator is, “Who is the fiduciary?” Or, asked another way, “Who will be the warm body sitting behind the defendant’s table in a fiduciary lawsuit?” That person has an interest in 1) knowing that they are a fiduciary because without that knowledge, it is impossible to act in accordance with fiduciary standards (attention is the first requirement of a prudent person), and 2) being covered by appropriate insurance (e.g. E&O, D&O, special ERISA policies). To illustrate, if I were a plaintiff’s lawyer or the Department of Labor pursuing a claim of fiduciary breach, and a corporation were the “employer” named as plan administrator (without further specific identification or express delegation), I would name every individual board member and executive officer personally as defendants. And let us not forget the poor HR administrator, who is always on the front line of dealing with benefits and may be a fiduciary by default because they are forced by practicalities to engage in fiduciary activity without the pleasure of being named as a fiduciary. Maybe most of those people could get themselves dismissed, but it would not be fun or happy. This is how the “small employer” exception makes sense. A single owner who also handles all executive functions is on the hook as “employer” no matter what because there is no one else to bother. That is the crux of it. How best to identify the plan administrator, and to align fiduciary responsibility, depends on the organization, its personnel, and its circumstances. There is not an arrangement that fits all, and the appropriate arrangement is often not given any thought when a plan is adopted or restated. I suspect you were asking for some specific models. I am playing the lawyers card of “it depends”.* The organization could name the “employer” as plan administrator, but then a lot of other actions and documentation would be required to achieve the proper identification and alignment. For the most part, that ain’t gonna happen. Even if it does, the Department of Labor can be so ham-fisted that it won’t understand or respect the niceties, and it likes as many people as possible to sweat personal liability. *For a corporation, how about designating the CEO as plan administrator, with authority to delegate, including the authority to designate other named fiduciaries. Depending on circumstances, the CEO will delegate authority rather than directly undertake the functions. The CEO’s corporate responsibility for oversight of company business, and fiduciary responsibility for oversight of persons the CEO names as fiduciary, overlap nicely. For a large organization, corporate or partnership (e.g. professional services), I like fiduciary committees, which can be designated as plan administrator, and populated by a CEO or equivalent. The CEO is still a fiduciary for this purpose.

I don’t think one can be too exacting about plan terms. Sometimes I wonder if I should be chagrined at the number of my posts that that assert something like, “the plan document sucks.” That said, sometimes it is appropriate to be vague, though not ambiguous. The issue with an artfully vague provision is that the fiduciary responsible for interpreting the provision has to apply it and might not be cued in to the intent behind the vagueness, and eventually may have to solidify the meaning over time as the provision is consistently applied. Also, the fiduciary may be uncomfortable with interpretation, especially if the fiduciary is unskilled or inexperienced (such as “the employer”, whoever that is at the moment — a dig at those who think it is OK to designate the employer as plan administrator). I hope you are not the fiduciary responsible for interpreting plan terms. As you describe the terms, the plan document sucks. If you are not, consult the poor fiduciary who is, as questions come up. If you are the fiduciary, consult the plan sponsor to determine the intent behind the provision, then to the extent feasible and consistent with qualification requirements and any history of interpretation/application, create a written interpretation that implements the appropriate intent and eliminates the uncertainties.

Please disregard the second paragraph of my response above. I am rethinking the matter. As the award language stands now, I am in line with the idea that the former spouse receives nothing. The question is whether or not a post-death order in this case can remedy the omission of a pre-death provision that the alternate payee is to be treated as a spouse. And I am doubling down on my criticism of the DOL.

This is another opportunity to rant about the abject failure of the Department of Labor to provide helpful guidance concerning post-death QDROs despite being directed to do so. Done. I do not understand when the participant terminated relative to the divorce judgment, which contains the award of the participant’s entire benefit. Also, the award language could be better. However, I don’t think it makes any difference. The former spouse was awarded the participant’s entire benefit, not the participant‘s death benefit. The participant was alive when this happened. Pre-QDRO death after a pre-death award in the divorce judgment should not change anything.* When a qualifying DRO is submitted, the alternate payee should receive a benefit in whatever form the participant could receive if the participant started benefits before death (actuarially adjusted for the AP). I do not address whether or not that includes the new lump sum benefit. Otherwise, a pension plan with only a QPSA would defeat QDROs whenever a participant dies before benefits start to the AP, and that cannot be what was intended under the law. *I am troubled by opportunities for adverse selection, but explanation of that concern will have to wait until another day. However, I will repeat that this is an area where the Department of Labor was directed to provide guidance and it did essentially nothing in the regulations that it issued. Done again. BTW, if the former spouse “gave” to the plan a copy of the divorce judgement that included terms of the pension plan settlement, that is a domestic relations order. Processing that order, even though the order will not qualify, provides the plan an opportunity to follow david rigby’s practical advice to inform the former spouse about its conclusion concerning the availability of any benefit whether or not a subsequent domestic relations order that covers the formal requirements for qualification is submitted.