Peter Gulia

EBECatty, thank you for the information about Relius and Ascensus. Does anyone know what’s in the ftwilliam documents? How about big recordkeepers—Empower, Principal, Voya, Hancock, Transamerica?

In reviewing an IRS-preapproved document, I saw this: “To the extent such laws are not preempted by federal law, the terms and conditions of this Plan will be governed by the laws of the state in which the Pre-approved Document Provider is located[.]” This choice sometimes might matter because the document can be used to state a non-ERISA plan. The document defines “Pre-approved Document Provider” not as the documents’ publisher but rather a retirement-services provider (a licensee of the documents). Is this choice-of-law provision now common?

Even if your client might consider someone else’s advice that an annual report and information return might not be required, your client might consider filing a Form 5500 return desirable because the IRS counts a plan trust’s Federal income tax statute of limitations from that filing. IRS Announcement 2007-63, 2007-30 Internal Revenue Bulletin (July 23, 2007). https://www.irs.gov/irb/2007-30_IRB#ANN-2007-63 When the plan’s administrator files its Form 5500 for 2020, three years later (and, often, practically sooner) 2020 will roll out of the years the IRS would examine. Although an employer might feel there is little risk that the IRS would find an operational defect for 2020, why would an employer/administrator leave open any possibility of being put to the burden of responding to IRS information requests (if it is inexpensive to file the 2020 Form 5500)?

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.) § 6652 (h) Failure to give notice to recipients of certain pension, etc., distributions In the case of each failure to provide notice as required by section 3405(e)(10)(B), at the time prescribed therefor, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, there shall be paid, on notice and demand of the Secretary and in the same manner as tax, by the person failing to provide such notice, an amount equal to $100 for each such failure, but the total amount imposed on such person for all such failures during any calendar year shall not exceed $50,000. amended by SECURE § 403(c). (i) Failure to give written explanation to recipients of certain qualifying rollover distributions In the case of each failure to provide a written explanation as required by section 402(f), at the time prescribed therefor, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect, there shall be paid, on notice and demand of the Secretary and in the same manner as tax, by the person failing to provide such written explanation, an amount equal to $100 for each such failure, but the total amount imposed on such person for all such failures during any calendar year shall not exceed $50,000.

Bird, thank you for your useful observation. Adding nothing, a typical notice already is too long and too difficult for any but the most capable and determined reader. If that assumption is right, which distributees would we harm by editing the notice? Many administrators (often by falling-in with a recordkeeper’s service) furnish a § 402(f) notice for every distribution. Some do so to lessen risks about failing to furnish a notice when it was required. Some do it because the notice is furnished (perhaps as a part of a claim form) before anyone has received a claimant’s claim, and so before one knows whether the to-be-requested distribution will be eligible or not. Also, one distribution might have within it a portion that is rollover-eligible and a portion that isn’t. If a notice is furnished to a distributee who gets a distribution or a portion that is not rollover-eligible, might it help (or at least not harm) a reader to get a little more information?

What do BenefitsLink people think about using the IRS’s safe-harbor texts and writing a little more so one notice covers differing possibilities or portions? For example: If this distribution or a portion of it is an eligible rollover distribution, . . . . If this distribution or a portion of it is not an eligible rollover distribution, . . . . Like? Dislike? Aside from whether you like or dislike this method, do you think it minimally complies with Internal Revenue Code § 402(f)?

For the query discussed above (including David Olive’s illustration), there are many ways a court, an arbitrator, an executive agency’s official, or a plan’s administrator (or its lawyer) might interpret ERISA’s §§ 102-105, § 404(a)(1), and related provisions. As far as I know, there is no EBSA guidance that interprets the statute or a rule to discern whether a plan’s administrator must or should not describe an expired provision. And I’m unaware of a consensus among employee-benefits lawyers. (I suspect many have not been asked any question about this.) If asked the question, it’s for each advisor to render her advice, considering the inquiring client’s interests and facts.

The exemption has no change after October 12, 1979. I’ve considered the exemption only once. (And it was longer ago than your experience.) I explained that the exemption does not relieve a plan’s fiduciary from its responsibility to act loyally and prudently for the exclusive purpose of providing the plan’s benefits. A fiduciary must get the best deal the plan could obtain. The insurance agency decided that its fiduciary responsibility required it to negotiate the life insurance contract to zero the commission with the insurer lowering the premiums for the contract’s death benefits and increasing the cash values. An actuary reported to us that the insurer’s profit margin on the negotiated contract was equal to its margin on the commission-loaded contract.

A support for Belgarath’s top-notch explanation is: Rev. Rul. 84-18, 1984-1 C.B. 88 [1984-6 Internal Revenue Bulletin 5]. See also News Release IR-84-6 (Jan. 13, 1984). The IRS held an individual may deduct an IRA contribution made after the tax return was filed but by the return’s due date. In the “law and analysis” for that ruling, the IRS observed: “Although the holding of Rev. Rul. 66-144 is limited to an accrual basis taxpayer, section 1013(c)(2) of [ERISA] extended the grace period of [Internal Revenue Code] section 404(a)(6) to cash basis taxpayers.”

Let’s ask a related question: Assume a nonlawyer TPA. The IRS-preapproved document is from one of the big document vendors. With no suggestion from the TPA, its client—the plan’s sponsor—wrote the variation of the default-beneficiary provision. The TPA considers that provision unwise. But the TPA believes a prudent plan administrator could interpret the provision as not granting discretion and not tax-disqualifying the plan. What duty or responsibility (if any) does such a TPA have to tell her client that the provision might be unwise?

The Labor department’s website has a listing of prohibited-transaction exemptions, organized by EXPRO, class, and individual exemptions. Under class exemptions, the website shows the history of an exemption, with Federal Register citations for each proposal, adoption, and amendment or clarification. (For example, the display on the Qualified Professional Asset Manager exemption includes eight citations.) Under “Insurance Agents In-house”, the display shows citations for the proposal and adoption (both in 1979) of PTE 79-60, and nothing further. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/exemptions/class Here’s the government’s posting of the portion of 44 Fed. Reg. 59018 (Oct. 12, 1979): https://s3.amazonaws.com/archives.federalregister.gov/issue_slice/1979/10/12/59015-59020.pdf#page=4 If it’s hard to read, better images are available from HeinOnline and other publishers.

What Luke Bailey says. And consider whether it makes sense for an employer/administrator to try to anticipate many situations in which an employee might lack enough pay for all the things one might do with it, develop the employer’s hierarchy, and set it as an interpretation and plan-administration procedure for all the employee-benefit plans.

Last May’s 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-31 (Alternative method for disclosure through electronic media—Notice-and-access) is available only for retirement plans. The Labor department reserved on health and other welfare-benefit plans. See paragraph (c). https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-XXV/subchapter-C/part-2520/section-2520.104b-31 A welfare plan may deliver electronic disclosures as provided under a participant’s or beneficiary’s affirmative consent. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-1 https://ecfr.federalregister.gov/current/title-29/subtitle-B/chapter-XXV/subchapter-C/part-2520/section-2520.104b-1

pmacduff alludes to a further inquiry: How many of these decisions are made, practically, by an employer falling-in with the way its payroll-services provider offers services?

Yes, it's frustrating; but until the IRS says something, what other advice could one render?

I don’t recall the earlier discussion you mention. But is this plausible: At least some BenefitsLink users work in business organizations with policies designed to keep people out of communications about prices for products or services if the communications might be troublesome under antitrust or competition laws. Even if some of those policies and outlooks might be more cautious than necessary, some of our neighbors follow those cautions.

Even without the mistaken withholding instruction you describe, an employer/administrator often might encounter the problem of lacking enough pay for all the things an employee might do with it. For example, consider a paymaster who must withhold for FICA taxes, three income taxes (Federal, State, and city or county), two or more unemployment and disability taxes, and might apply salary reductions for the employee’s portion for health coverage, a health flexible spending account, a dependent-care account, and a 401(k)/403(b)/457(b) elective deferral. Some employers develop an internal hierarchy—sometimes written, often not—to sort out these and other competing demands on an employee’s pay. Most concur that withholding taxes comes before any of the health, other welfare, and retirement benefits. And within employee benefits, most prioritize maintaining health coverage over voluntary retirement savings. While I’ve never seen the Treasury or its IRS publish anything on this point, it should be unseemly for the IRS to assert as a tax-disqualifying operational defect an employer/administrator’s failure to apply perfectly an employee’s elective-deferral election if the reason was properly withholding taxes, especially any Federal tax. About coordinating wage reductions across the many employee benefits and providing it in or under the plans’ governing documents, that’s possible when one law firm works on all plans of the employer. It’s hard to do using IRS-preapproved and other documents that come from the plans’ service providers. And even employers that use custom documents for all or most of the plans often don’t want to pay for the time it would take to do this right.

The statute sets up authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to use credits and adjustments beyond the OASDI-HI and other wage tax credits the statute sets up as the first go-to. One must look for “[t]he Secretary [to] issue such regulations, or other guidance, forms, instructions, and publications, as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out [the continuation subsidy].” Won’t the news be all over the web about an hour after the IRS’s release?

After recognizing a surviving spouse’s rights (whether ERISA-mandated or otherwise plan-provided), practitioners and plan sponsors have a range of views about what default-beneficiary provisions make sense. And even those answers can vary with circumstances about a plan’s administration. ESOP Guy is right that someone who understands difficulties that can result from the absence of a designation is much less likely to neglect making a designation. A default of the participant’s children also can burden a claimant. For example, if a plan’s claims administrator receives a claim from someone who proves she is the participant’s daughter and says she is her mother’s only child, must the administrator require some further evidence to prove the claimant is the participant’s only child? How does one prove the non-existence of more children than the claim names? And if a whole account balance is paid out but the administrator later receives a claim from the participant’s second child, what is the plan’s obligation to the participant’s children beyond the one who was paid?

Are you thinking about a risk beyond the business risks of the fund's portfolio companies?

The text of New York City’s legislation includes this: Covered employer. The term “covered employer” means any employer as defined in subdivision 3 of section 190 of the labor law that (i) employs no fewer than five employees whose regular duties occur in the city, consistent with any rules promulgated by the retirement savings board pursuant to section 20-1408; (ii) has employed no fewer than five such employees without interruption for the previous calendar year; (iii) has been in continuous operation for at least two years; and (iv) has not offered or maintained in the preceding two years a retirement plan, provided that an entity described in clauses (i) through (iv) in the definition of “participating employer” shall not constitute a covered employer. https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?From=RSS&ID=3498476&GUID=6E78D2BB-A4BA-4FD8-8C03-ABA62C914AEB An employer would want its lawyers’ advice about how to interpret this.

If the employer is sure it has no one living or working in NYC, it would consider New York State’s law, which you found is voluntary—that is, the State law imposes no punishment on an employer that does not facilitate the program.

SSRRS, it’s unclear whether your query is about New York State or New York City. There are differences between the State’s and the City’s law.

Would the plan would get no less interest than a bank would get for the same loan to that borrower? Practically, the retirement plan would need to get more interest so the extra covers the plan’s expenses of doing the deal, including fees for a lawyer to render an opinion that the transaction meets the conditions of a prohibited-transaction exemption and fees for an independent fiduciary to find that the transaction is fair to, and prudent for, the plan. And why would the borrower incur that extra if it can borrow from a bank (in a deal that would lack those incremental transaction expenses)?

Bird, thank you. I apologize for being unnecessarily sensitive. Some BenefitsLink people think some of my queries are too fanciful, and I do sometimes anticipate issues. I wanted the group to know this query is grounded on a real and current client request. MoJo, thank you for your further explanation that your reasoning would not change if you were unconstrained and directly advising a plan’s administrator. RatherBeGolfing, thank you for your further suggestions about ways to consider potential pitfalls.